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Abstract
How economic agents can make sense from imperfect information is a central challenge
in economic theory. In this thesis, I ﬁrst explore how voters try to infer the quality of
their government based not only on the information they personally receive but also on
observations of their home and foreign governments' policies. Can voters learn from such
information and thus any improved accountability reduce "political pandering"? Secondly, I
study two models of education where the incentives of both students and ﬁrms are profoundly
aﬀected by the imperfect informativeness of education certiﬁcates and study how increases
in enrolment and tuition fees aﬀect educational and job market outcomes.
The ﬁrst chapter, Pandering Across Borders, studies when voters can use information
from foreign countries to reduce domestic political pandering, and when pandering is conta-
gious between countries. The voters condition their electoral decisions not only on policies
chosen in their home countries, but also on those implemented abroad. Since the policy
decisions are driven by re-election concerns, both sources of information may be biased.
As a result, informational linkages between the countries give rise to pandering externalities
which lead to ambiguous welfare eﬀects of access to international news. The model also shows
that institutional harmonisation via internal synchronisation of election dates increases the
parameter range in which pandering may occur.
Beliefs, Access Constraints and Voluntary Education Decisions, the second chapter of
this thesis, contributes to the debate on the negative consequences of high growth rates in
university enrollment with a focus on CEE countries. I propose a theory how low education
supply elasticities in the short run can lead to self-fulﬁlling equilibria in a setting in which
signalling is reduced to an eﬀortless binary certiﬁcation technology. When the agents believe
that the certiﬁcation precision is low they enrol at a higher rate and, due to those inelastici-
ties, their beliefs fulﬁl. The opposite holds when the agents have high beliefs on the quality.
The selection among these equilibria depends on students' initial beliefs about the quality
of the certiﬁcation technology.
The ﬁnal chapter, Tuition Fees in a Signalling Model of Education, analyses the trade-oﬀ
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between tuition fees and educational eﬀort. Education serves purely as a signaling device
and implies a non-pecuniary cost inversely proportional to students' ability, while tuition
fees are independent of ability. In this framework, higher tuition fees can be beneﬁcial for
high ability students since they reduce the enrolment rates of the less able agents reducing
the eﬀort level necessary to separate. The overall eﬀect of tuition fees is complex and is
associated with non-monotonicities in actions of the players in the model
Chapter 1
Pandering Across Borders
Abstract
Economies are increasingly linked through common shocks but remain sovereign politically;
this paper studies when voters can use information from foreign countries to reduce domes-
tic political pandering, and when pandering is contagious between countries. The voters
condition their electoral decisions not only on policies chosen in their home countries, but
also on those implemented abroad. As both sources of information may be biased, since
the policy decisions are driven by re-election concerns, the welfare implications of additional
information are ambiguous. Compared to a single country model, the quality of voters in-
formation has to be signiﬁcantly weaker for the pandering to appear. However, pandering
in one country creates information distortion also for voters abroad. Existence of those pan-
dering externalities leads to an increase of pandering probability in the equilibrium in which
this behaviour occurs. The model also shows that institutional harmonisation, via internal
synchronisation of election dates, increases the parameter range in which pandering may
occur.
Keywords: Pandering, Information, Electoral Cycles
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D72, D78, D82.
1.1 Introduction
Representative democracies allow politicians discretion over policy. This allows them to
implement even unpopular policies, if they believe them to be in the social interest. Alterna-
tively, politicians could pander to the moods of the electorate and implement popular, but
suboptimal, decisions. I study in this paper how international linkages aﬀect politicians' in-
5
6 Chapter1
centives to pander in a setting with rational voters; furthermore, I study when institutional
harmonisation  in terms of internally synchronised election dates  promotes or reduces
political pandering. To my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study of pandering in a cross-national
setting.
I study a two-country model. The two countries share the same state of the world. In
each country, voters receive a noisy public signal on the state of the world. Privately informed
politicians may be of high quality, in which case they observe the state of the world directly,
or low quality - in this case, they receive a noisy signal, but one which is still more precise
than voters' information. In each country, the incumbent politician - observing his signal
and the domestic voters' prior beliefs about the optimal action - ﬁrst implements a policy;
in the case where the politician implements the voters' preferred policy against his superior
information, I shall speak of pandering. In the next stage, the true state of the world is
revealed to voters in both countries with some probability. Voters also observe the policy
decision made in the other country. The election stage follows, where voters apply Bayesian
updating to their information to assess the probability of their incumbent being low-quality
and vote accordingly. If their posterior belief about the quality of the incumbent exceeds
the expected quality of the challenger, the incumbent secures re-election. Otherwise, he is
replaced with a challenger.
When voters have access to foreign information, pandering is often attenuated. For ex-
ample, if the government of one country is commonly known to be of high quality, pandering
cannot arise in either country. Also, under asynchronous election dates, the government with
the longer horizon towards the election, and hence a higher chance that the voters will learn
the true state of the world, has a lower incentive to pander. But voters in the country with
the early election also observe the foreign policy, learning from it and making it more likely
that domestic pandering will be discovered by voters. This can also eliminate pandering
equilibria. In such a setting, when decisions taken in one country are free of pandering, they
serve the voters also in the other country as an additional, unbiased source of information.
International linkages can, however, also lead to pandering contagion. In such equilibria,
pandering is an equilibrium only if governments in both countries co-ordinate on a pandering
strategy. Policy co-ordination, where governments in both countries implement the same
decision, may then be wrongly interpreted by voters as good indication of truthful policy.
The voters' trust in the state of the world, inﬂated by the policy co-ordination, gives the
governments an opportunity to pander to a greater extend than if the decisions were taken
without the information from the other country. This is because when pandering occurs in
both countries, policy harmonization is less informative - the signal is jammed. Relatedly,
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Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) or Prat (2005), have shown in diﬀerent settings that more
information does not always reduce pandering.
When the state of the world underlying the incumbents' decisions is the same across the
two countries, asynchronous electoral cycles are weakly dominant for voter welfare. With
asynchronous cycles, voters in one of the countries have more time for learning the outcomes
of implemented policies. Voters equipped with good enough information enforce truthful
strategies, when the electoral race is close. In such a case, the actions of the government in
that country are used by the voters in the other country as unbiased signals. The foreign
policies become equivalent to unbiased media as in Ashworth and Shotts (2010), and hence
a good indicator of the true state of the world. Under synchronous election cycles, voters in
both countries have the same information level. If the common election date happens to be
far ahead in time and the voters are likely to learn the true state of the world, pandering is
unlikely. However, it may happen that elections take place when the voters in both countries
have a low level of information. Although learning from actions taken abroad still takes place,
pandering decisions distort this process. When the probability of voters learning the true
state of the world is suﬃciently low, pandering contagion occurs. The decision to pander in
one country enforces pandering abroad.
Pandering is an important feature of representative democracies. Not only is pander-
ing frequently alleged to be contagious by political observers,1 but it has been shown that
pandering can occur in an equilibrium even when voters are fully rational. Pandering in eco-
nomic literature can be understood in two ways. In Canes-Wrone et al. (2001), a modelling
framework for this paper and already cited Ashworth and Shotts (2010), governments and
voters share preferences over the actions. They receive, however, diﬀerent signals about the
optimal choice. In this setting, pandering implies ignoring socially valuable information if it
goes against the ex ante preferred action of the majority.
A diﬀerent strand of the literature shows how pandering can arise when politicians'
preferences are not aligned with those of voters. In this type of model the non-congruent
incumbent politicians are implementing policies that are ex post socially harmful. If prior
popular belief is in favour of such a policy, a non-congruent politician can not only implement
1Recent British anti-migration rhetoric and steps taken by the British prime minister David Cameron
to curb inﬂow of new workers and restrict access to social beneﬁts for foreigners, despite ample evidence
on net beneﬁts of migrants for the British economy, has been an inspiration for growth of anti-migration
sentiment in Germany. The nationalisation of Hungarian pension funds by Victor Orban's government is
said to be an inspiration for a similar decision taken by Donald Tusk's government in Poland. The transfer
of resources from private pension funds to the state budget will reduce the reported public debt and allow
for ﬁscal expansion in the election year.
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privately preferred policy, but also secure re-election (cf Maskin and Tirole (2004)). The
relationship between voters' perceptions of policymakers and policy choices has been studied
in this type of environment. Fang (2008) analyses external sources of information and shows
that the existence of unbiased international institutions enforces both biased and unbiased
politicians to seek policy advice and hence to reduce the policy bias. Morelli and VanWeelden
(2013) combine the two branches and consider how the incentive to pander relates to voters'
perceptions of candidates' preferences and valence.
Pandering externalities have been studied in the context of electoral competition. Hei-
dhues and Lagerlöf (2003) show, in a simple framework with binary actions, that electoral
competition leads to pandering. In a recent, spatial model of electoral competition, Kartik
et al. (2013) show that the direction of this eﬀect is just the opposite and that competition
leads to anti-pandering. The politicians commit to policies that put more weight on the
private signals than what is subscribed by an unbiased strategy.
The Synchronisation of electoral cycles has been discusssed as a reform proposal for the
European Union. Sapir and Sekkat (1999) identify the optimal degree of synchronisation in
a model with two open economies and cross-country spillovers from political business cycles
in a model with two open economies. The authors extend the earlier literature on political
business cycles to the open economy setting. They show that when voters are concerned
about inﬂation and employment, the incumbent, in a period prior to the election, is likely
to manipulate inﬂation which, if unanticipated, aﬀects employment. This behaviour is likely
to induce 'political business cycles'. With a high degree of economic interdependence, these
cycles would tend to spill over between countries. For instance, a politically motivated
expansion of aggregate demand in one country could induce eﬀects on economic activity
abroad. Such spillovers create coordination problems. The authors conclude that the impact
of coordinating electoral calendars depends on the type of the international spillovers. If the
spillovers are positive, the coordination on a single election date is never harmful. This
paper aims to answer the same research question and analyses the welfare implications of
the synchronisation of electoral calendars between two countries. However, the source of
possible welfare eﬀects is fundamentally diﬀerent. In my model, the decisions taken abroad
do not aﬀect the home economy directly. They are used, only, as a source of information.
Nevertheless, the coordination of electoral still cycles matters.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section outlines the model. Section 1.3 shows
the equilibrium analysis of the game. Section 1.4 analyses the beneﬁts of information avail-
ability and compares the results to the baseline model, in which the voters learn only the
decisions taken in their home countries. In Section 1.5 I discuss the implications of institu-
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tional harmonisation via the internal synchronisation of election dates. Finally, Section 1.6
concludes.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 Setup
In each of the two periods Nature draws a single state of the world shared by two identical
countries c ∈ {D,F}; ω ∈ {A,B} in period one and ω˜ ∈ {A˜, B˜} in period two. States of
the world are the same across countries and independent across time with Pr(ω = A) =
Pr(ω˜ = A˜) = pi > 1/2. The governments' policy choices in each country are xc ∈ {A,B} in
period one and x˜c ∈ {A˜, B˜} in period two. The correct policy for each period matches the
state of the world, i.e., xc = ω and x˜c = ω˜. Representative voters in each country observe
both actions and with probability ρ learn the true state of the world. At the end of the ﬁrst
period representative voters choose to re-elect the incumbent or remove her from oﬃce by
electing a challenger. Overall, the sequence of actions is as follows
1. Nature determines the quality θ of the incumbent I and challenger O in each country.
2. Nature determines the ﬁrst period state of the world ω.
3. The incumbents observe private signals sIc .
4. The incumbents simultaneously select the policies xc.
5. Nature determines whether the voters in each country learn ω before the election.
6. The voters V either re-elects the incumbent I or elects the challenger O.
7. New state of the world ω˜ and signals s˜Ic , seen by the new incumbent, are drawn by
Nature and new actions x˜c taken.
Graphically, the timeline is presented on Figure 3.1.
1.2.2 Players
In each country, the incumbents and challengers are of type θc ∈ Θ = {H,L}, i.e. they
can be either of high quality or of low quality. The quality of each is private information
and is determined by Nature. In each country, both the incumbent and the challenger are
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Figure 1.1: Timeline
drawn from the same pool of politicians and the probability of a politician to be of a high
type is γ ∈ (0, 1). The incumbents, independently in each country, receive private signals
about the state of the world sIc ∈ {A,B} in period one and s˜Ic ∈ {A,B} in period two. A
high-quality politician's signal is perfect: sIc = ω and s˜
I
c = ω˜. A low-quality incumbent's
signal is informative but not perfect: Pr(sIc = ω|ω) = Pr(s˜Ic = ω˜|ω˜) = q > pi. The fact that
q > pi assures that even for the low types, the state of the world indicated by the signal is
more likely to happen.
Incumbents receive utility from their political legacy, which is built if they implement a
policy that favours the citizens, i.e. they chose a policy that matches the state of the world
ω in period one and ω˜ in period two. The pay-oﬀ of the incumbent is, therefore:
U Ic =
{
1 if xc = ω
0 if xc 6= ω
}
+
{
1 if x˜c = ω˜ and re-elected
0 if x˜c 6= ω˜ or if not re-elected
}
The utility from the decision taken in period one will be referred to as the ﬁrst period
utility. If the incumbent is re-elected she receives a chance to leave a legacy in the subsequent
term, after which the game ends. This speciﬁcation assures that the high type strictly prefers
not to pander in the ﬁrst period, as long as there is some uncertainty about the re-election.2
The subsequent period pay-oﬀ weighted by the re-election probability will be referred to as
the second period utility. The challenger's utility is similar to the incumbent's second period
utility. He receives 1 if elected and the policy chosen in the second period is correct and zero
otherwise.
2Discounting would not qualitatively change the results.
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The voters in both countries are policy motivated with utility
UVc =
{
1 if xc = ω
0 if xc 6= ω
}
+
{
1 if x˜c = ω˜
0 if x˜c 6= ω˜
}
Since the voters take their actions only once the policy decisions are already taken, only
the second-part of the utility function is relevant for the voters' electoral choices. As the
second period utility depends on the quality of the government, the voters act prospectively
and elects the candidate who he believes is more likely to be high quality.
In making this choice the voter does not directly observe the quality of the incumbent.
However, he does observe the policies xD and xF chosen in each of the countries, which
may tell him something about the incumbent's quality. Finally, I assume that with some
probability ρ ∈ [ (1−q)(1−pi+q−2piq)
2piq2
, 1]3 the uncertainty about the state of the world ω resolves
(in both countries at the same time). With probability ρ, the voter learns the true ﬁrst
period state before election day; otherwise he votes knowing only the policy choices made in
each country. Formally, the voter's signal is sV ∈ {A,B, φ}, where φ means no information.
If uncertainty resolves then sV = ω. The rationale for the restriction on ρ is explained in
Lemma 1.3.2. A low ρ means that either the election is imminent (so there is little time for
information to be publicly revealed) or that the policy being chosen is unlikely to produce
any easily assessed short run eﬀects.
The model presented here is based on the Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) setting. To allow for
comparisons with the baseline model I keep the original assumptions and notation whenever
possible.
1.2.3 Beliefs and Strategies
For incumbents in each country, I specify strategies in four information sets: the incumbent
is high or low quality and receives a signal sIc = A or s
I
c = B. Let σ
θ,c
s ∈ [0, 1] be the
probability that a type θ incumbent in a country c who observes signal s chooses policy
xc = A. If, upon observing the signal indicating the ex ante less likely action B, the
politician implements the voters' preferred policy A against his superior information, it
shall be deﬁned as pandering. The strategies depend on the politician's beliefs about the
state of the world. The high-quality politician's beliefs about the state of the world are
trivial since she receives a perfect signal. As in Canes-Wrone et al. (2001), her strategies
are also simple; she always follows her signal in the ﬁrst period (σH,cs=A = 1 and σ
H,c
s=B = 0)
3The restriction on ρ is slack for pi >
√
2
2 .
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because the potential utility gain from re-election never outweighs the sure loss incurred
by choosing the wrong ﬁrst-period policy. Low type's beliefs are more complicated and
are given by Pr(ω = A|sIc = A) = qpiqpi+(1−q)(1−pi) , Pr(ω = B|sIc = A) = (1−q)(1−pi)qpi+(1−q)(1−pi) ,
Pr(ω = A|sIc = B) = (1−q)pi(1−q)pi+q(1−pi) , Pr(ω = B|sIc = B) = q(1−pi)qpi+(1−q)(1−pi) .
Voters receive information from two sources, the signal sV and the actions of the gov-
ernments. Since the countries share the state of the world, both actions taken at home and
abroad convey information to the voters. Therefore, for voters in each country, I specify
strategies and beliefs in twelve information sets: for each possible observable policy couplets
({xc = A, x−c = A}, {xc = A, x−c = B}, {xc = B, x−c = A} and {xc = B, x−c = B}) for
each signal observed sV ∈ {A,B, φ}.
Let the voter's strategies in these information sets be the probabilities that the voter in
country c re-elects the incumbent, be denoted by νcxc,x−c,sV . Likewise, let the voter's beliefs
about the probability that the incumbent is high quality be denoted by µcxc,x−c,sV .
The equilibrium concept that I employ is that of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, where this
equilibrium concept is deﬁned in the usual way: all players (governments of both types in
both countries and voters in both countries) must make optimal choices at all information
sets given their beliefs, and the beliefs are formed using Bayes' rule when that is deﬁned. For
the sake of brevity I will refer to a strategy proﬁle of the players as an equilibrium if there
exist beliefs of the players such that this strategy proﬁle together with these beliefs form a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
1.3 Analysis
Solving the game by backward induction, I start with politicians elected for the second
period. Since the game ends then, they always follow their signals and a high type receives
utility 1, while a low type receives, in expectations, q. The voters enter the game in their
respective countries when the ﬁrst period decisions are already taken. The voters' second
period utilities are equal to the governments' second period utilities, therefore voters' only
objective is the maximisation of the future government's quality. The voters will use the
information revealed in actions taken in both countries and the observed state of the world,
and re-elect the incumbent if the belief about her quality exceeds the probability that the
challenger is a high type (γ). Otherwise, they replace the incumbent. Therefore, the voters
will always choose cut-point strategies. The voters' beliefs are as follows.
Lemma 1.3.1. If the incumbents always follow their signals the ordering of the voters' beliefs
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is the following:
0 = µcA,A,B = µ
c
A,B,B = µ
c
B,A,A = µ
c
B,B,A < µ
c
B,A,φ < µ
c
A,B,φ < γ
γ < µcB,B,φ < µ
c
A,A,φ < µ
c
A,A,A = µ
c
A,B,A = µ
c
B,A,B = µ
c
B,B,B < 1
Lemma 1.3.1 follows directly from Bayes' Rule. The lemma says that when an action
taken by the home government does not match the observed state of the world, the voter is
certain that the incumbent is of low quality. When the observed state of the world matches
the action, the voter's posterior belief about the incumbent's quality exceeds the prior γ.
When the state of the world is not observed the posterior belief depends also on the action
taken abroad and hence is sensitive to the foreign incumbent's strategies. For more details
and the proof see the Appendix.
Lemma 1.3.2. When ρ > (1−q)(1−pi+q−2piq)
2piq2
the low type incumbent always chooses action
xc = A upon observing s
I
c = A.
When ρ is suﬃciently high, action A is the best response for the low type government
receiving the signal indicating the ex ante more likely state of the world, sIc = A. It holds
for all strategies of the low type receiving signal B and all strategies of the low type abroad.
For the proof, see the Appendix.
Within this range, the further analysis of the government actions can be, therefore,
limited to strategies of the low types observing signal sIc = B.
The following lemma presents two relations crucial for the key results presented in the
paper.
Lemma 1.3.3. If high types and low types receiving signal A follow their signals then:
i) It always holds that:
µcA,B,φ < γ < µ
c
B,B,φ
ii) If home incumbent of the low types receiving signal B panders with suﬃciently high
probability, σL,cB > σ
L,c
B , the ordering of beliefs between µ
c
B,A,φ, µ
c
A,A,φ and γ changes to
µcA,A,φ < γ < µ
c
B,A,φ
For the proof and the explicit expression for σL,cB , see the Appendix. Lemma 1.3.1 and
Lemma 1.3.3 show that, given the imposed restriction on ρ, the order of posterior beliefs
relative to the prior γ is sensitive to strategies of a low type receiving signal B only when
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the uncertainty about the true state of the world is not resolved and the observed actions
are {B,A} or {A,A}.4
Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) in their single country model show that there exist two types
of equilibria depending on the value of ρ. If the voters learn quickly (ρ is suﬃciently high)
there is no pandering in equilibrium. All types of incumbents follow their signals. However,
as ρ decreases, beneﬁts from pandering for the low type receiving signal B, when the state
of the world is not observed, outweigh the losses that accrue when the voters learn the true
state. In the other type of equilibrium occurring when ρ is low, when the low type receives
a signal A, she always acts truthfully and when the signal is B, she panders with positive
probability. In a two country setting, as in this paper, the situation is more complicated
due to pandering externalities. Beliefs on the quality of home politicians are determined not
only by the observed action at home, but also by actions taken abroad. To structure the
analysis that follows I deﬁne two types of equilibria that will emerge.
Deﬁnition 1.3.1.
1. A Truth Equilibrium (TE) is an equilibrium in which all players in both countries follow
their signals, i.e. σH,cA = σ
H,−c
A = σ
L,c
A = σ
L,−c
A = 1 and σ
H,c
B = σ
H,−c
B = σ
L,c
B = σ
L,−c
B =
0.
2. A Pandering Equilibrium (PE) is an equilibrium in which low types in both countries
pander with positive probability i.e. σH,cA = σ
H,−c
A = σ
L,c
A = σ
L,−c
A = 1, σ
H,c
B = σ
H,−c
B = 0
and σL,cB = σ
L,−c
B ∈ (0, 1].
The conditions under which the deﬁned equilibrium types occur are described in the
proposition below.
Proposition 1.3.1. When the probability of learning the true state of the world by the voters
is ρ < 1 , then
1. When the probability of learning the truth is suﬃciently high, ρ > ρ, the Truth Equi-
librium is the only equilibrium.
2. For lower values of ρ < ρ there is an equilibrium multiplicity. Both the Pandering
Equilibrium and the Truth Equilibrium can emerge.
4Given that incumbents in all other information sets follow the truth, which holds in equilibrium (in all
equilibrium types)
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The detailed proof together with the threshold value of ρ and the speciﬁcation of equi-
librium strategies is presented in the Appendix.
Intuitively, as in Canes-Wrone et al. (2001), pandering may bring beneﬁts only when the
true state of the world is not revealed. Conditional on uncertainty resolving, the incumbent
needs to match his policy to the state, and he wants to follow his signal.
Conditional on uncertainty not resolving, policy co-ordination, where governments in
both countries implement the same decision, is interpreted by voters as a good indicator for
truthful policy and hence on high incumbent's quality. The home incumbent needs to match
the foreign government's action.
Observation 1.3.1. If the foreign incumbent always follows the truth, the home incumbent
never panders.
When the foreign government always follows the truth, the home incumbent, in an at-
tempt to match the foreign policy, chooses the action most likely to be the foreign incumbent's
signal, i.e. plays truth.5 Therefore the Truth Equilibrium exists for all values of ρ.
Since pandering abroad implies an increase in the probability that policy A is taken, it
increases the returns to pandering for the home government. Given the imprecision of the low
type signals, foreign pandering makes the co-ordination on A more likely. Therefore, when
ρ is suﬃciently low and the degree of pandering abroad suﬃciently high, pandering becomes
contagious. This strategy becomes the best response for the home low type government. The
beneﬁts from pandering accrue only when the uncertainty is not resolved, therefore for the
Pandering Equilibrium to exist, ρ has to be suﬃciently low. This equilibrium type, however,
is unstable, as it is based on mixed strategies of both the voters and the low type incumbents
in each country.
It has to be noted that the two types of equilibria described exist also for ρ < (1−q)(1−pi+q−2piq)
2piq2
,
ruled out by assumption. However, in this range the set of equilibria is richer than the two
equilibria deﬁned in the proposition.
Proposition 1.3.2. From the voters' perspective a Truth Equilibrium is strictly better than
a Pandering Equilibrium. All types of incumbents are better oﬀ in a Pandering Equilibrium.
5The information received by the voters through the action of the truthful foreign government, is exactly
the same as the information transmitted by the unbiased media in the Ashworth and Shotts (2010) setting
when the political and media announcements are simultaneous. Ashworth and Shotts (2010) also analyse
cases in which the voters prior beliefs about incumbent and challenger quality diﬀer where pandering occurs
despite additional unbiased information.
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For the detailed proof see the Appendix. Intuitively, in the Pandering Equilibrium voters
re-elect the incumbents more frequently. As explained in detail in the proof of Proposi-
tion 1.3.1, in both types of equilibrium, when the true state of the world is observed, the
voters re-elect when the action taken by the home government matches the true state of the
world. In the Truth Equilibrium, when the voters do not receive a signal they re-elect only
upon observing {A,A, φ} and {B,B, φ}, while in Pandering equilibrium, in addition, they
also re-elect with positive probability upon observing {B,A, φ}.
Voter welfare is composed of the ﬁrst and the second period payoﬀs. It is immediate
that when the incumbent panders, she reduces the probability of making the correct action
and hence reduces the voter's ﬁrst period utility. The eﬀect on the second period utility is
ambiguous. On the one hand, if the state of the world is not revealed, pandering increases
the re-election probability of a low type to a greater extent than high types'. At the same
time, since low type incumbents are less frequently using their signals the voters can more
frequently detect the low types when the true state of the world is revealed. After some
algebra, it can be shown that the ﬁrst period utility eﬀect always outweighs the second
period eﬀect.
1.4 Isolation or Integration?
When the voters do not learn about the actions taken abroad, actions in one country don't
aﬀect the beliefs of voters in the other country and the model is identical to Canes-Wrone
et al. (2001). The comparison of the results of the two speciﬁcations sheds light on the role
of access to international news on political decision making. To enhance clarity, it is useful
to apply the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1.4.1.
1. When countries are Isolated, the voters observe only actions taken in their home coun-
try
2. When countries are Integrated, the voters observe actions taken both in their home
countries and in the foreign country.
The results of the Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) model can be summarised in the following
lemma:
Lemma 1.4.1. When countries are isolated and the incumbents and challengers are drawn
from the same pool of politicians, there are two types of equilibrium depending on the value
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of ρ. When ρ > ρ̂ = (1−q)(pi−q+2piq)
2(1−pi)q2 there is a unique Truth Equilibrium. For lower values of
ρ, the Pandering Equilibrium is the only equilibrium. If the government is of a low type and
receives a signal B she panders with probability σLB = σ̂
∗,L
B = 1− 1−pipi(1−q)+(1−pi)q . Otherwise the
government always follows the truth.
For the proof, see Canes-Wrone et al. (2001).
To show the potential costs and beneﬁts from integration, I compare the results of the
two settings.
Proposition 1.4.1. When the two countries are Integrated, the threshold level ρ above which
pandering never occurs is strictly lower than when the countries are Isolated (ρ < ρ̂). How-
ever, the degree of pandering in the Pandering Equilibrium when the countries are Integrated
is strictly higher than in the Pandering Equilibrium when the countries are Isolated.
The result comes directly from the comparison of the expressions for the threshold values
ρ and ρ̂ presented in Lemma 1.4.1 and in the proof of Proposition 1.3.1. Intuitively, when
countries are Integrated, actions taken in both countries convey information. As a result,
the critical amount of information necessary to make following the signals the incumbents'
optimal strategy in all information sets is collected for lower ρ. However, the advantages of
an additional source of information turn detrimental when the governments actually decide
to pander and hence bias the information source. Since the underlying state of the world is
shared by the countries, a co-ordination of actions on the same policy is a stronger indicator
of government quality than a choice of a popular action in an Isolated country. As a result,
when countries are Integrated, a higher pandering probability is necessary for voters to
change their re-election strategies. It has to be noted, however, that when the countries
are Isolated, pandering is the only equilibrium when ρ < ρ̂, while in integrated countries
the Pandering Equilibrium is only one of the two equilibrium types that may emerge when
ρ < ρ. The ranges of existence of the two types of equilibria in an Isolated and Integrated
country for select set of parameters is presented graphically in Figure 1.2.
Lastly, the implications of the diﬀerent equilibrium types in the two settings for voters'
welfare outlined in the next proposition.
Proposition 1.4.2. From the voters' expected utility perspective
1. The Truth Equilibrium when the countries are Integrated is strictly better than any
equilibrium in an Isolated country.
2. Pandering Equilibrium when the countries are Integrated is better than the Pander-
ing Equilibrium when the countries are Isolated when q is suﬃciently low and γ is
suﬃciently high.
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Figure 1.2: The ange of existence of diﬀerent equilibrium types in an Isolated and an Inte-
grated country for γ = 0.5 and diﬀerent values of p, ρ and q
1 (white area) - the Truth Equilibrium in an Integrated and an Isolated country, 2 (light
gray area) - the Truth Equilibrium in an Integrated country and the Pandering Equilibrium
in an Isolated country, 3 (dark gray area) - the Truth and the Pandering Equilibria in an
Integrated country, the Pandering Equilibrium in an Isolated country, 4 (black area) - the
area ruled out by assumption ρ ∈ [ (1−q)(1−pi+q−2piq)
2piq2
, 1]
For the proof, see Appendix. Intuitively, in Truth Equilibrium the voters receive only
unbiased information. When the countries are Integrated, voters have access to more infor-
mation which leads to better electoral decisions. More surprising is 2. which results from a
trade-oﬀ between more distortion when the home or foreign incumbent is of a low type and
receives a signal B and more unbiased information coming from governments in choosing to
play truth. When q is low, low type governments have little informational advantage over
the voters, therefore pandering leads to little loss of socially valuable information.
1.5 Extension - Diﬀerent Election Dates
The outlined setting allows also for an analysis of the implications of institutional harmonisa-
tion via internal synchronisation of election dates between countries. The degree of electoral
cycle synchronisation aﬀects the diﬀerence in time to elections between the countries and
hence the voters' probability of learning the true state of the world. Therefore, in this sec-
tion, I allow the voters' probabilities of learning the truth to diﬀer between the countries.
More speciﬁcally, I assume that the voters receive public information about the true state of
the world in two chunks. Immediately after the governments' actions, they observe the true
state with probability ρL. After some time, if the true state of the world is not revealed, they
receive another signal and learn the truth with probability ρM ≡ ρH−ρL1−ρL . The assumption on
ρM implies that the ex ante probability of learning the truth after observing two signals is
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ρH .
Deﬁnition 1.5.1.
1. When the cycle is Synchronised, elections are held on the same date in each country,
hence the value of ρ is the same across the countries.
i) If elections are early after the policy decisions, the voters observe only the ﬁrst
signal and hence, the probability of voters learning the truth is ρL in each country.
ii) If elections are late after the policy decisions, the voters receive both signals and
hence, the probability of voters learning the truth is ρH in each country.
2. When the cycle is Asynchronous, elections are held on diﬀerent dates in each country.
Therefore, there is always one country in which elections are early and one in which
elections are late.6
The diﬀerences between the harmonisation regimes are presented graphically on Fig-
ure 1.3 for an Asynchronous cycle, on Figure 1.4(a) for a Synchronised cycle with early
elections and in Figure 1.4(b) for a Synchronised cycle with late elections. The ﬁgures
present the sequence of actions in period t = 1 only. The timing in t = 2 is, in all cases,
identical to the baseline scenario presented in the previous sections and drawn in Figure 1.1.
Nature
chooses
ω, θID, θ
I
F ,
θOD, θ
O
F
Incumbents
learn
θIc , s
I
c
Challengers
learn
θOc
Incumbents
choose
xc ∈ {A,B}
Voters see
xD, xF ;
ω w.p. ρL
Elections
in D
Voters see
ω w.p. ρM
Elections
in F
in D and in F
Figure 1.3: Asynchronous Electoral Cycle: Timeline (t = 1)
6One can question this assumption given the diﬀerent probabilities of observing the true state of the world
in each period. Alternatively we can assume that there is an ex ante probability m ∈ (0, 1) of a voter in a
given country receiving one signal and probability 1−m of receiving also a second chance to observe the true
state of the world. In such a case a synchronised cycle implies that with probability m both countries observe
only one signal and with probability 1−m both countries observe both signals. Asynchronous cycle would
imply that with probability m2 voters in both countries observe only one signal, with probability 2m(1−m)
voters in one country receive one and voters in the other country receive two signals and with probability
(1−m)2 voters in both countries receive both signals before the elections. Such a setting, qualitatively, does
not change the results.
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Figure 1.4: Synchronised Electoral Cycle: Timeline (t = 1)
Due to assumptions on the values of ρM and ρH the time between the actions taken and
the elections can be reduced to a single period with a value of ρ ∈ {ρL, ρH} determining the
actual time until the election. Furthermore, I assume 1−pi−piq−q
2+2piq2
2piq2
< ρL < ρH = 1. The
latter assumption, although not inconsequential, is used for mathematical tractability.
Proposition 1.5.1. 1. When the cycle is Synchronised and elections are late, Truth Equi-
librium is a unique equilibrium.
2. When the cycle is Synchronised, elections are early and voters' information suﬃciently
high (ρL > ρ) the Truth Equilibrium is a unique equilibrium.
3. When the cycle is Synchronised, elections are early and voters' information is low
(ρL < ρ) there is an equilibrium multiplicity. Both the Truth Equilibrium and the
Pandering Equilibrium can emerge.
4. When the cycle is Asynchronous, the Truth Equilibrium is a unique equilibrium.
Proof. The model outlined in Section 1.2 and analysed in Section 1.3 is equivalent to the Syn-
chronised cycle, therefore, the results presented in Proposition 1.3.1 can be applied directly
in this proposition. Since, by assumption, ρH > ρ, 1. holds. Since
1−pi−piq−q2+2piq2
2piq2
< ρL < 1,
2. and 3. hold.
The Asynchronous cycle allows for a kind of information sharing between the voters in
the two countries. The less informed voters from the country with early elections beneﬁt
from better information in the other country. Since ρH = 1, there is no pandering in the
country with informed voters. As a result, the voters in the country with early elections are
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exposed to an unbiased source of information through the foreign government actions. As
Observation 1.3.1 suggests, the unbiased information assures that the home government also
never panders, as stated in 4..
The advantage of the Asynchronous cycle is that it helps steer the incumbents oﬀ the
Pandering Equilibrium. The Asynchronous cycle uniquely assures the Truth Equilibrium.
This is not the case with the Synchronised cycle. In this regime, if elections are early and
the probability of learning the truth is suﬃciently low, both the Truth and the Pandering
equilibria can emerge.
1.6 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature on the organisation of international politics in two
ways. It discusses the consequences of enhanced knowledge about the decisions taken on
other countries coming from international news. Secondly, it shows that harmonized electoral
cycles can have adverse political economy eﬀects.
I present a two country model in which the countries share the same state of the world.
Governments in each of the countries receive, independently, private signals about the state
and take actions observable by voters in both countries. When voters don't observe the
true state of the world with certainty, a low quality politician may ignore socially valuable
information if it goes against the ex ante preferred action of the majority. When the state
of the world is not observed, international linkages allow the voters to infer about the state
of the world and the incumbent's quality also from the actions taken abroad, which leads
to pandering externalities. An increase in the degree of pandering in one country positively
aﬀects the returns to pandering in the other country by distorting voters' information. This
results in a possibility of pandering contagion, a situation in which an increase in pandering
in one country makes the best response in the other country to switch from truthfulness to
pandering.
Access to information about the policies chosen abroad is beneﬁcial for the voters as it
reduces the range of parameters in which the incumbents pander. When this information is
available, for the pandering to occur, the threshold probability of voters learning the true
state of the world is strictly lower than when the country is isolated. However, the advantage
of international linkages does not come at no cost. In contrast to the media announcements
in the Ashworth and Shotts (2010) model, the political actions taken abroad may convey
biased information. When the voters learn the policy choices of the foreign countries, they
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excessively trust that policy co-ordination is a good indication of correct policy choices,
which allows the governments to pander at a higher rate than when the countries are isolated.
Therefore, media coverage of foreign aﬀairs is good when the outcomes of the implemented
policies are easily observable. However, for long term policies, for which the true state of
the world is unlikely to be observed, e.g. climate policy or pension reforms, and for issues
driven strongly by value systems such as sexual and religious minority rights or abortion the
linkages between countries may accelerate the spread of incorrect policies.
The model also shows that a synchronised electoral cycle is never better for the voters
than an asynchronous cycle. In the latter regime, having a long time until elections in one
of the countries gives the voters a good chance of learning the outcomes of the policy choices
and ensures truthful behaviour. This gives voters in the other country a reliable enough
source of information about the state of the world that they also enforce truthful behaviour.
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Appendix - Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.3.1
To show this result I apply the intuition presented in Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) to the
extended setting. The beliefs can be considered in three groups. First, if uncertainty is
resolved, the beliefs about the quality of the home government are independent of the actions
taken abroad. Therefore, when xc 6= ω, the voter knows the incumbent is low quality because,
as noted before, a high-quality incumbent always follows her signal, which is perfect, and
hence always chooses the correct policy. Thus it holds that when xc 6= ω, µcxc,x−c,sV = 0.
Second, if uncertainty is resolved and xc = ω, the voter's belief that the incumbent is high
quality, is strictly greater than γ, her ex-ante belief, because high quality politicians receive
better signals than the low-quality ones. The posteriors are strictly less than one since
low-quality politicians also sometimes choose xc = ωc.
Third, if uncertainty is not resolved, the voters infer about the state of the world only
from the actions taken. Since the state of the world underlying the decisions is the same in
both countries, actions taken both at home and abroad are informative. The beliefs µcB,A,φ,
µcA,B,φ, µ
c
B,B,φ, µ
c
A,A,φ are strictly positive, since the high type always follows their signals.
At the same time they are strictly lower than the beliefs formed when the true state of the
world matches the action observed. Lack of resolution allows for the decision taken to be
wrong, which can happen only if the incumbent is of low type.
The relations µcB,B,φ > γ and µ
c
A,A,φ > γ while µ
c
B,A,φ < γ and µ
c
A,B,φ < γ come from
the fact that when the home incumbent is of a high type, it is more likely that the foreign
politician takes the same action than if the home incumbent is of a low type.
The relations µcB,B,φ < µ
c
A,A,φ and µ
c
B,A,φ < µ
c
A,B,φ come from the fact that a signal A is
more frequently received by high types. The probability of the low type receiving signal A
is given by piq + (1− pi)(1− q) is strictly lower than pi.
For the sake of completeness the posterior beliefs in each information set are presented
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below:
µcB,A,φ =
(1− p)(1− q)(1− γ)γ
(1− p)(1− q)(1− γ)γ + (1− γ)((1− p)(1− q)q(1− γ) + p(1− q)(q(1− γ) + γ))
µcA,B,φ =
p(1− q)(1− γ)γ
p(1− q)(1− γ)γ + (1− γ)(p(1− q)q(1− γ) + (1− p)(1− q)(q(1− γ) + γ))
µcB,B,φ =
(1− p)γ(q(1− γ) + γ)
(1− p)γ(q(1− γ) + γ) + (1− γ) (p(1− q)2(1− γ) + (1− p)q(q(1− γ) + γ))
µcA,A,φ =
pγ(q(1− γ) + γ)
pγ(q(1− γ) + γ) + (1− γ) ((1− p)(1− q)2(1− γ) + pq(q(1− γ) + γ))
µcA,A,A =
pγ(q(1− γ) + γ)
pq(1− γ)(q(1− γ) + γ) + pγ(q(1− γ) + γ) =
γ
q + γ − qγ
µcA,B,A =
p(1− q)(1− γ)γ
p(1− q)q(1− γ)2 + p(1− q)(1− γ)γ =
γ
q + γ − qγ
µcB,A,B =
(1− p)(1− q)(1− γ)γ
(1− p)(1− q)q(1− γ)2 + (1− p)(1− q)(1− γ)γ =
γ
q + γ − qγ
µcB,B,B =
(1− p)γ(q(1− γ) + γ)
(1− p)q(1− γ)(q(1− γ) + γ) + (1− p)γ(q(1− γ) + γ) =
γ
q + γ − qγ
Proof of Lemma 1.3.2
Not following the signal can be beneﬁcial only if the state of the world is not revealed. In
such a case the voters can be in one of the four information sets, depending on the observed
actions. It is easy to show that if a low type government receives a signal A and the voter
plays νcA,A,φ = 1, ν
c
A,B,φ = 1, ν
c
B,A,φ = 0, ν
c
B,B,φ = 0, the incumbent is re-elected whenever
she plays A. For other beliefs, the situation is not so clear-cut. Nevertheless, simple algebra
shows that when νcA,A,φ = 1, ν
c
A,B,φ = 0, ν
c
B,A,φ = 0, ν
c
B,B,φ = 1, A is always the best response,
whenever ρ > 1 − (1+q)(pi+q−1)
2piq2(1−γ) . When ν
c
A,A,φ = 0, ν
c
A,B,φ = 0, ν
c
B,A,φ = 1, ν
c
B,B,φ = 1, A is
always the best response, whenever ρ > (1−q)(1−pi+q−2piq)
2piq2
. Finally, when νcA,A,φ = 0, ν
c
A,B,φ = 1,
νcB,A,φ = 1, ν
c
B,B,φ = 0, A is always the best response, whenever ρ > 1 − (1+q)(pi+q−1)2q(piq−(1−pi)(1−q)γ) .
The three thresholds coincide for γ = 0. For all other values of γ, (1−q)(1−pi+q−2piq)
2piq2
is strictly
greater than the two other values.
Proof of Lemma 1.3.3
Voter's belief that the incumbent is high quality, given the strategies of the home and foreign
incumbents receiving signal B σL,cB and σ
L,−c
B and the observed action when the true state of
the world is not observed are as follows:
µ
c
A,A,φ =
pγ((σ
L,−c
B
(1− q) + q)(1− γ) + γ)
pγ((σ
L,−c
B
(1− q) + q)(1− γ) + γ) + (1− γ)((1− p)(1− q + σL,−c
B
q)(1− q + qσL,c
B
)(1− γ) + p(q + (1− q)σL,c
B
)((σ
L,−c
B
(1− q) + q)(1− γ) + γ))
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µ
c
B,B,φ =
(1− p)γ((1− σL,−c
B
)q(1− γ) + γ)
(1− p)γ((1− σL,−c
B
)q(1− γ) + γ) + (1− γ)
(
(1− σL,−c
B
)p(1− q)2(1− σL,c
B
)(1− γ) + (1− p)q(1− σL,c
B
)((1− σL,−c
B
)q(1− γ) + γ)
)
µ
c
A,B,φ =
(1− σL,−c
B
)p(1− q)(1− γ)γ
(1− σL,−c
B
)p(1− q)(1− γ)γ + (1− γ)((1− σL,−c
B
)p(1− q)(q + (1− q)σL,c
B
)(1− γ) + (1− p)(1− q + qσL,c
B
)((1− σL,−c
B
)q(1− γ) + γ))
µ
c
B,A,φ =
(1− p)(1− q + σL,−c
B
q)(1− γ)γ
(1− p)(1− q + σL,−c
B
q)(1− γ)γ + (1− γ)((1− p)q(1− q + σL,−c
B
q)(1− σL,c
B
)(1− γ) + p(1− q)(1− σL,c
B
)((σ
L,−c
B
(1− q) + q)(1− γ) + γ))
To see 1. note that the more pandering there is in a given country, the more likely it is
that when action B is taken the incumbent is of a high type. Therefore, the more pandering
there is in the foreign country, when a pair of actions {A,B} is observed, the more likely it
is that the action A is taken by the misinformed low type. Therefore, as pandering either
in the foreign country or at home increases, the value of µcA,B,φ decreases, i.e. stays below
γ. The same mechanism makes µcB,B,φ increase in the level of pandering in either of the
countries, keeping it above γ.
To see 2. it suﬃces to apply the same logic to µcB,A,φ and µ
c
A,A,φ. It is easy to show that
the former probability is increasing in the low type pandering, both and home and abroad.
At the same time µcA,A,φ is decreasing in pandering both at home and abroad. The more the
politicians pander, the less likely it is that an action A is taken by a high type. At the point:
σL,cB = σ
L,c
B =
(1− q)(pi(1 + σL,−cB − σL,−cB γ)− (1− (1− σL,−cB )q)(1− γ))
σL,−cB (pi − 2piq + q2) (1− γ) + (1− q)(q(1− γ) + piγ)
the two probabilities are equal. If there is no pandering in the foreign country, the two beliefs
are equal at σL,cB =
pi+q+γ−qγ−1
q+piγ−qγ . The value of σ
L,c
B that makes the two beliefs equal decreases
with the degree of pandering abroad.
The actions of incumbents of other type, or observing other signals, obviously, aﬀect also
these beliefs. However, as it has been stated, given the pay-oﬀ structure, high type never
panders and, given the assumptions on ρ, the low type receiving signal A also never panders.
Proof of Proposition 1.3.1
Given the pay-oﬀ structure and the restriction on ρ, the high types and low types receiving
signals A always follow them. Lemma 1.3.3 implies that in ten out of twelve information
sets voters' actions are independent of the beliefs held. The strategies are always νcA,A,A = 1,
νcA,B,A = 1, ν
c
B,A,A = 0, ν
c
B,B,A = 0, ν
c
A,A,B = 0, ν
c
A,B,B = 0, ν
c
B,A,B = 1, ν
c
B,B,B = 1, ν
c
A,B,φ = 0
and νcB,B,φ = 1. All that remains to be identiﬁed is the strategies ν
c
B,A,φ and ν
c
A,A,φ.
Incumbents' ﬁrst period utility is strictly increasing in probability of taking a correct
action. Second period utility is built of two elements that depend on voter's information.
27
If the uncertainty is resolved, given the beliefs held by the voter outlined in Lemma 1.3.1,
this component coincides with the ﬁrst period utility.7 When voters don't learn the truth,
the pay-oﬀ depends also on the actions taken in the other country. Pandering decisions need
to take into account losses from a sure decrease in the ﬁrst period utility, a sure decrease
in the re-election prospects when the uncertainty is resolved and possible beneﬁts from the
increase in the second period utility when the uncertainty is not resolved.
Suppose, now, that a low type receives a signal B and home voter's strategy is νcB,A,φ = 1
and νcA,A,φ = 0. In such a case, when s
V = φ the incumbent gets surely re-elected by playing
xc = B.
8 As xc = B also maximises the re-election prospects when the truth is revealed and
the ﬁrst period utility, it must be the best response.
When home voter plays νcB,A,φ = 0 and ν
c
A,A,φ = 1, the situation is less clear for a low type
receiving a signal B. When the uncertainty is not resolved, the re-election prospects depend
also on the action taken abroad.9 However, it can be shown that when γ > pi+q−2piq
2q−2piq , B is
played strictly more frequently than A by the incumbent in the other country.10 Therefore,
in this range, the choice of action xc = A strictly decreases the re-election prospects and
no pandering is the best response. For lower levels of average quality of the political class,
pandering may increase the expected pay-oﬀ, when the uncertainty is not resolved, if the
degree of pandering abroad is high enough. It can be shown, however, that even if the low
type abroad always chooses x−c = A, when the probability of voters learning the truth is
suﬃciently high, i.e. :
ρ > 1− q − pi
2(1− pi)q(1− γ)
pandering is never the best response. The beneﬁts from pandering when the uncertainty is
not resolved never outweigh the losses to the other components of the low type's pay-oﬀ.
For lower levels of ρ there always exists a level of pandering in the other country that makes
pandering the best response.
For suﬃciently low γ, suﬃciently low ρ and suﬃciently high degree of pandering abroad,
pandering could be the optimal action under condition that νcB,A,φ = 0 and ν
c
A,A,φ = 1 is the
voters best response. However, as Lemma 1.3.3 states, when σL,cB > σ
L,c
B it is not the case
7Up to the scaling factor, the expected second period pay-oﬀ if re-elected, i.e. 1 for high types and q for
the low type.
8Since Lemma 1.3.3, νcA,B,φ = 0 and ν
c
B,B,φ = 1
9Since νcA,A,φ = 1 and ν
c
B,B,φ = 1 the best response for x−c = A is xc = A and the best response for
x−c = B is xc = B
10In this range, the probability of the government in the other country being of high quality is so high,
that given the signal received B is the most likely action, even if the foreign incumbent of the low type
always plays A
28
anymore. Therefore, holding the actions abroad ﬁxed, the only possible set of mutual best
responses between the voters and the incumbent is such that the incumbent plays σL,cB = σ
L,c
B
and the voter plays νcA,A,φ = 1 and sets ν
c
B,A,φ to such a level that the incumbent is indiﬀerent
between xc = A and xc = B.
Assume that such a value νcB,A,φ exists and the incumbent in c plays σ
L,c
B . Since the two
countries are ex ante identical, the same logic can be applied to −c. Therefore, it is possible
calculate the value σ∗,LB such that σ
∗,L
B = σ
L,c
B = σ
L,−c
B . Some algebra proves that:
σ
∗,L
B
=
pi(1− q)(1− 2γ) + 2q(q + γ − qγ − 1) +
√
pi(1− q) (5pi + 8q − 9piq + 4(1− pi)(2− 3q)γ − 4(1− pi)(1− q)γ2 − 4)
2
(
pi − 2piq + q2) (1− γ)
It is easy to calculate that when the low type abroad chooses σL,−cB = σ
∗,L
B the voter's
action that makes the incumbent indiﬀerent between xc = A and xc = B is ν
c
A,A,φ = 1 and
νcB,A,φ = ν
∗
B,A,φ such that:
ν
∗
B,A,φ =
2
(
q(1 + q) +
√
piq
√
(1− q) (5pi + 8q − 9piq + 4(1− pi)(2− 3q)γ − 4(1− pi)(1− q)γ2 − 4)(1− ρ)− pi (1 + q2(1− ρ) + qρ))
√
piq
(√
(1− q) (5pi + 8q − 9piq + 4(1− pi)(2− 3q)γ − 4(1− pi)(1− q)γ2 − 4)−√pi(1− q)) (1− ρ)
Given the symmetry, the same actions are chosen by the voters in the other country. For
this set of strategies to be an equilibrium, it remains to assure that there exists a set of
parameters in which the following holds. When the incumbent in the foreign country plays
σL,−cB = σ
∗,L and home voter plays νcA,A,φ = 1 and ν
c
B,A,φ = ν
∗
B,A,φ pandering is the best
response. Some algebra proves that a Pandering Equilibrium exists for suﬃciently low ρ, i.e.
for
ρ < ρ =
pi − q − (1− pi)q2 + q√pi(1− q) (5pi + 8q − 9piq + 4(1− pi)(2− 3q)γ − 4(1− pi)(1− q)γ2 − 4)
q
(√
pi(1− q) (5pi + 8q − 9piq + 4(1− pi)(2− 3q)γ − 4(1− pi)(1− q)γ2 − 4)− pi(1− q)
)
The Pandering Equilibrium is, however, not unique. In the same range of parameters
the Truth Equilibrium can also emerge. Since signals are informative and the true state the
world is the same across the countries, if the incumbent in the foreign country always follows
the truth, x−c = B is the most likely action, given sIc = B. Since, ∀σL,cB ∀σL,−cB µcA,B,φ < γ,
choice of xc = A when x−c = B is the most likely action abroad does not lead to a re-election
and hence does not increase the second period utility. At the same time pandering strictly
reduces the ﬁrst period utility, therefore the joint eﬀect of pandering is strictly negative.
For ρ > ρ, since the voter is too likely to learn the truth and the incumbents always
follow the truth; the Truth Equilibrium is a unique equilibrium;
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Proof of Proposition 1.3.2
Voter's expected utility is simply the probability a correct action in each period. This prob-
ability depends on the government's quality in each of the periods and the equilibrium type.
I will refer to equilibrium type as τ ∈ {TE, PE}, where TE denotes a Truth Equilibrium
and PE denotes a Pandering Equilibrium. The expected ﬁrst period utility is, simply, the
probability of a correct action in the ﬁrst period. The second period utility depends on
the re-election probability. In each of the equilibrium types, when the state of the world
is revealed (with probability ρ) the incumbent gets re-elected when the action matches the
true state of the world. When the state of the world is not revealed re-election probability
varies between the equilibrium types. If the incumbent is replaced with a challenger, with
probability γ the challenger is of a high type and brings utility 1 and with probability (1−γ)
is of a low type and brings, in expectations, utility q. Formally voter's expected utility in a
given equilibrium and given the incumbents' type is given by:
E
[
UVc |θc, τ
]
= (1 + ρAθc)Bθcτ + (1− ρ)(AθcCθcτ + (γ + (1− γ)q)(1− Cθcτ ) (1.6.1)
Aθc is a type dependent probability of taking a correct action in the second period - AL = q
and AH = 1. Bθcτ is the probability of taking a correct action in the ﬁrst period. It depends
on the type of incumbent and the equilibrium type.
BHT = BHP = 1
BLT = (1− p)q + pq
BLP = pq + (1− p)q(1− σ∗,LB ) + p(1− q)σ∗,LB
Cθcτ is the re-election probability. It also depends on the incumbent and equilibrium type.
CHT = (p(γ + (1− γ)q) + (1− p)(γ + (1− γ)q))
CHP = (p(γ + (1− γ)q + (1− q)σ∗,LB ) + (1− p)(γ + (1− γ)q(1− σ∗,LB ) + (1− γ)(1− q + qσ∗,LB )ν∗B,A,φ))
CLT =
(
(1− p)(1− q)2(1− γ) + p(1− q)2(1− γ) + (1− p)q(q(1− γ) + γ) + pq(q(1− γ) + γ))
CLP =
(
(1− p)q(γ + q(1− γ)(1− σ∗,LB )) + p(1− q)2(1− γ)(1− σ∗,LB )
)
(1− σ∗,LB )+
(1− p)(1− q)(1− γ)(1− q + qσ∗,LB ) + pq(γ + (1− γ)(q + (1− q)σ∗,LB ))+
σ∗,LB ((1− p)q(1− γ)(1− q + qσ∗,LB ) + p(1− q)(γ + (1− γ)(q + (1− q)σ∗,LB )))+
ν∗B,A,φ(1− σ∗,LB )((1− p)q(1− γ)(1− q + qσ∗,LB ) + p(1− q)(γ + (1− γ)(q + (1− q)σ∗,LB )))
The expected voters utility in a given equilibrium type is given by:
E
[
UVc |τ
]
= γE
[
UVc |θc = H, τ
]
+ (1− γ)E [UVc |θc = L, τ]
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The dominance of the Truth Equilibrium comes from comparison of the expected utilities
in the two equilibium types in the range of parameters in which a Pandering Equilibrium
exists.
Proof of Proposition 1.4.2
When the countries are Isolated we can also write voters' expected utility in a form of
Equation 1.6.1. To distinguish from the Integrated setting, I will refer to Âθc , B̂θcτ ,Ĉθcτ as the
equivalents of Aθc , Bθcτ ,Cθcτ in the Isolated country. Compared to the Integrated countries,
the values of Âθc , B̂HT and B̂HP are the same as under Integration, B̂LP = pq + (1 − p)q(1 −
σ∗,LB ) + p(1− q)σ̂∗,LB and the values of Ĉθcτ are given by the following:
ĈHT = p
ĈHP = p+ (1− p) ∗ ν̂∗B
ĈLT = pq + (1− p)(1− q)
ĈLP = (1− p)(1− q) + pq + (p(1− q) + (1− p)q)(1− σ̂∗,LB ) + (p(1− q) + (1− p)q)ν∗Bσ̂∗,LB
Where ν̂∗B =
p(1+qδ−2q2δ(1−ρ))−q(1−q(δ−2δρ))
q(q+p(1−2q))δ(1−ρ) is the equilibrium probability of voters re-
electing the incumbent when the true state of the world is not revealed and the observed
action is B. Low type's pandering probability is σ̂∗,LB = 1 − 1−pipi(1−q)+(1−pi)q (cf Canes-Wrone
et al. (2001)).
To see 1. note that the only diﬀerence between the Truth Equilibrium in an Integrated
and an Isolated country is in the re-election probability when the true state of the world is
not observed. The diﬀerence between the two is given by the following
CHT − ĈHT = q + γ − qγ − p > 0
and
CLT − ĈLT = (1− 2q)(p− q(1− γ)− γ) > 0
In the Truth Equilibrium when the countries are Integrated the re-election probability of
both high and low types is strictly higher than under isolation. While the former positively
aﬀects the voters' expected utility, the latter has the negative eﬀect. However, it is easy to
show that the overall eﬀect of Integration is positive as:
γ ∗ (AH − (AH ∗ γ + (1− γ) ∗ AL)
(
CHT − ĈHT
)
+ (1− γ)(AL − (AH ∗ γ + (1− γ) ∗ AL)
(
CLT − ĈLT
)
=
= 2(q − 1)2(q(1− γ) + γ − p)(1− γ)γ(1− ρ) > 0
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where AH ∗ γ+ (1− γ) ∗AL is the expected second period utility if the challenger is elected.
Due to algebraic complexity 2. can be shown only numerically. Table 1.1 presents voters'
expected utility in a Truth Equilibrium and a Pandering Equilibrium for an Integrated and
an Isolated country.
Table 1.1: Voter's expected utilities in diﬀerent equilibrium types
p=3/5 p=4/5
q=p+ (1−p)10 q=p+
5(1−p)
10 q=p+
9(1−p)
10 q=p+
(1−p)
10 q=p+
5(1−p)
10 q=p+
9(1−p)
10
γ
=
1/
3
ρ=1/4
∅ 1.531 1.739 ∅ 1.947 ∅ ∅ 1.757 1.852 ∅ 1.973 ∅
1.538 1.524 1.740 ∅ 1.947 ∅ 1.766 1.756 1.869 ∅ 1.973 ∅
ρ=1/2
∅ 1.531 1.739 ∅ 1.947 ∅ ∅ 1.759 1.868 ∅ 1.973 ∅
1.542 ∅ 1.741 ∅ 1.947 ∅ 1.766 1.758 1.869 ∅ 1.973 ∅
ρ=3/4
∅ 1.538 1.740 ∅ 1.947 ∅ ∅ 1.761 1.869 ∅ 1.973 ∅
1.545 ∅ 1.741 ∅ 1.947 ∅ 1.767 ∅ 1.869 ∅ 1.973 ∅
γ
=
2/
3
ρ=1/4
∅ 1.765 ∅ 1.863 1.973 ∅ ∅ 1.880 ∅ 1.926 1.987 ∅
1.784 ∅ 1.875 ∅ 1.974 ∅ 1.887 1.881 1.935 ∅ 1.987 ∅
ρ=1/2
∅ 1.773 1.872 ∅ 1.974 ∅ ∅ 1.881 1.935 ∅ 1.987 ∅
1.785 ∅ 1.875 ∅ 1.974 ∅ 1.887 ∅ 1.935 ∅ 1.987 ∅
ρ=3/4
∅ 1.780 1.874 ∅ 1.974 ∅ ∅ 1.883 1.935 ∅ 1.987 ∅
1.787 ∅ 1.875 ∅ 1.974 ∅ 1.887 ∅ 1.935 ∅ 1.987 ∅
Each cell of the table represents voters expected utility in one of the two equilibrium types
for an Isolated and an Integrated country, top left - a Truth Equilibrium in an Isolated
country; top right - a Pandering Equilibrium in an Isolated country; bottom left - a
Truth Equilibrium in an Integrated country; bottom right - a Pandering Equilibrium in
an Integrated country. ∅ implies that the particular equilibrium type does not exist for a
given set of parameters. A cell in which a Pandering equilibrium yields higher welfare for
an Integrated than an isolated country is marked green.
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Chapter 2
Beliefs, Access Constraints and
Voluntary Education Decisions
Abstract
In the recent decades university enrolment has grown enormously, however, as this paper
points out, this increase might not have only benign welfare consequences.
I focus on universities as certiﬁcation devices, that rather than enhancing students' human
capital, transmit (imperfect) information about the abilities of their graduates to potential
employers. I explore the eﬀects of perverse incentives, for agents with low innate abilities, to
enrol in university only when the quality of the education sector is low. When the access to
education is exogenously constrained and the number of university places does is not suﬃcient
to meet the educational needs, some of the high types are left without quality certiﬁcates.
As the access to academic resources becomes less competitive, enrolment among the high
types increases. Consequently, employers become more pessimistic about the quality of the
workers without a diploma, leading to a vicious circle of excessive educational enrolment.
The eﬀect is even stronger when the supply of academic resources is inelastic i.e. when
an increase in enrolment, for a ﬁxed investment per student, leads to a decrease in quality.
Multiple equilibria exist and the ﬁnal outcomes depend on agents' initial beliefs. Individual
beliefs on returns to education are crucial for selecting among multiple equilibria.
In so far as large scale surveys can reveal societal beliefs, empirical data from the Central
and Eastern European countries are broadly consistent with the model.
Keywords: Certiﬁcation, Higher Education, Access Constraints
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D82, C72, H42 , I23
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2.1 Introduction
The last 50 years can be considered the age of university education. The enrolment rates
at tertiary education institutions have increased from around 5% in the early 1950s in most
developed countries to more than 50% in recent times (Ansell (2010)). There are various
reasons for this change. Undoubtedly, the technological progress has increased the demand
for skilled labour (cf Card and DiNardo (2002)). Population growth in the western world has
signiﬁcantly decreased (in some countries it is even negative). The resulting increase in the
relative scarcity of labour in relation to capital justiﬁes higher investment in human capital.
Societal perception of higher education has also changed. It is no longer a consumption good
enjoyed by the elite but an investment in human and social capital. Access to universities
has become more universal and a reduction of entrance constraints for the socially impaired
groups is an important social and political issue. This quote by Barr (2004) gives an idea of
current perceptions. "The expansion of higher education throughout the OECD and beyond
is both necessary and desirable."
However, mass university education does not necessarily imply mass success on the labour
market. Recent studies show an increase in overeducation rates. An increasing number of
graduates take jobs that do not utilise their qualiﬁcations (Felstead et al. (2007)). There
is no agreement in the literature about what explains this phenomenon. Education quality
may be insuﬃcient and not lead to accumulation of human capital, a hypothesis that is
supported by evidence on credential inﬂation. Another possible explanation for the limited
success of mass education is the change in relative innate abilities of graduates compared
to non-graduates. Or, simply, the demand for skilled labour may not go in hand with the
increased supply.
The focus of the discussion has been so far on developed countries, which experienced a
rapid growth of university enrolment in the 1980s and earlier. In many developing countries
this change took place later and was even more rapid. Figure 2.1 depicts the relative growth
of the population of students in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Western Europe in
the last decade.1
In some countries, e.g. in Romania or Poland, the annual changes to the student popula-
tion were often exceeding 10%. The number of enrolled students in CEE from 1999 to 2007
1 Figure 2.1 is based on gross enrolment data, therefore it double-counts students enrolled at more than
one faculty, but it represents the actual capacity use of those students. At the same time, this overestimates
the eﬀect of the students that are registered without actual use of the university services (e.g. register just
in order to receive the student status).
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Figure 2.1: Change in student population in 1999-2007
Source: UIS UNESCO database, 1999=1
has increased, on average, by 69%, compared to only a 13% increase in Western Europe (the
EU15).2 CEE countries are clearly catching up with their more developed neighbours and
are bridging the education attainment gap. Thanks to the growth in the last two decades the
proportion of the population with higher education has reached the level in developed coun-
tries or has even exceeded it. This sudden growth certainly raises questions about capacity
constraints in education system.
This rapid growth was possible due to socio-economic changes following the fall of com-
munism. The change of the economic system has created huge changes in the demand for
human capital since it restored the link between marginal productivity and wages. To meet
this demand there was a large liberalisation of the higher education market which lead to
an expansion in the size of existing public universities and the foundation of numerous pri-
vate universities. The strict government control of the curricula and student numbers was
lifted. Private institutions, oﬀering education for a fee, moved the burden of ﬁnancing edu-
cation from the governments towards the users and increased the capacity of the education
systems.3
2Calculated using the UNESCO Institute for Statistics database.
3There were numerous other reasons for an increased demand for higher education in the region. E.g.
the rapid economic transition lead to a large increase in unemployment in the region in the early 1990s,
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The enrolment rates in CEE have increased despite general concerns about the quality of
higher education. Although empirical evidence is very scarce (Machin and McNally (2007)),
press reports supported by reports commissioned by national authorities raise these issues.4
The main objective of this study is to analyse, from a theoretical perspective, the eﬀects
of improving access to university education, when university's' sole purpose is the provision
of certiﬁcation. In particular, I propose a mechanism that can shed light on the strikingly
high growth of tertiary education enrolment rates in CEE. More speciﬁcally, I analyse what
happens when the strict state control over the higher education system (through capacity
controls) is being lifted. Therefore, I focus on a change in the welfare of agents between the
system with restricted access to certiﬁcation and one with unrestricted access. The aspect
of administrative restrictions on certiﬁcation provision is, to my knowledge, unexplored in
the literature. I will show that the relaxing of admission restrictions for higher education
can be beneﬁcial only if the certiﬁcation quality is suﬃciently high. Obviously, access to
certiﬁcation may be desirable on other grounds. In this paper, however, I am focusing on
the link between Pareto-eﬃciency, access and certiﬁcation quality. Finally, I show the eﬀects
of short term supply inelasticities, resulting in a decrease in certiﬁcation quality, and their
inﬂuence on an increase in enrolment rates. Hence, the higher the growth in enrolment rates,
the lower the certiﬁcation precision for a given level of per student expenditure.
In the model, I assume that agents, diﬀering in their innate abilities, are privately in-
formed about their type. They may, at a cost, voluntarily undergo an imperfect certiﬁcation
process, which is the only mechanism by which they can signal their abilities to the compet-
itive employers. The employers oﬀer one type of job in which the productivity of the worker
is deﬁned by his type, though two job types and supermodularities in the job-worker match
are explored in the extension of the basic model. The bigger the imperfections, the higher
the chances for those of low innate abilities to receive the high ability certiﬁcate. Due to
the nature of certiﬁcation, the concepts: education quality, certiﬁcation quality and luck are
therefore university education was a way to delay entering the labour market. The opening of the EU labour
markets was the driving force for the university enrolment rates' growth in the later years, at least for the
new member states. Even though many graduates could not ﬁnd the jobs in their ﬁelds, they hoped to
capitalize on their education through emigration (Thaut (2009)). Finally, the growth in the gross number
of students is caused also by the increase in the number of students that study at more than one faculty in
order to signal their quality.
4E.g. E&Y and IBnGR (2009). This position is also backed by the World Bank (2005), which recommends
undertaking substantial changes needed in tertiary education to shift the focus from quantity to quality. E.g.
a study for Lithuania states the "poor quality education system is blamed for the country's failure to produce
educated young people with skills and knowledge suited to Lithuania's labour market needs, thus contributing
to emigration motivations and recent labour shortages in certain sectors" (Thaut (2009)).
Beliefs, Access Constraints and Voluntary Education Decisions 37
equivalent in determining outcomes in the presented setting.
The model is designed to analyse the eﬀects of the relaxing of the constraints on access
to education. I present two regimes. In the ﬁrst regime, restrictions in access are modelled
through exogenous limits on certiﬁcation supply. The number of university places is ﬁxed
regardless of the level of demand. In the second regime, the exogenous capacity constraints
are lifted and access to education is given to all who apply.5
In the extension of the model I analyse the short run eﬀects of the transition. I assume the
existence of short term capacity constraints, given by a convex short term certiﬁcation quality
provision cost function. I assume that agents make their educational decisions based on prior
beliefs on the return to education. I will show that those beliefs can be self-conﬁrming. The
imperfection of certiﬁcation can be interpreted as the role of chance in examinations and,
possibly, social connections in determining education outcomes.6 In the extended model with
the convex cost function, a rapid growth of enrolment over a short period of time pushes
the education/ certiﬁcation quality down, increasing the role of luck in the process. If, on
the contrary, agents initially believe that education is more precise in revealing their true
type, low skill agents abstain from education. Diﬀerences in prior beliefs in the population
of agents can lead to diﬀerences in educational outcomes due to the existence of multiple
equilibria in the model. This result could be a possible explanation for diﬀerences in the
growth rates of higher education in CEE.
In context of education economics, this paper contributes to our understanding of the
eﬀects of an expansion of tertiary education, particularly in transition countries. This phe-
nomenon has been studied in the empirical literature mainly in parallel with the college-high
school wage gap (see e.g. Card and Lemieux (2001) or Walker and Zhu (2008) for the US, UK
and Canadian data). The eﬀect of the higher education expansion in transition economies
has been, to my knowledge, unexplored.
This paper is a contribution to the literature on quality disclosure thoroughly reviewed by
Dranove and Jin (2010). My work draws mostly on a short paper on imperfect certiﬁcation
and it's implications on the market size by De and Nabar (1991). The authors present
a simple model with two risk neutral, privately informed sellers of diﬀerent types, a single
buyer and an exogenous certiﬁcation technology (which is costly and imperfect). The authors
present a disturbing result, that the higher the certiﬁcation accuracy a lower the demand for
5An alternative interpretation is an improvement in access due to e.g. an introduction of a large scale
student loan programme or simply a baby boom.
6An alternative mechanism that ﬁts into this framework is corruption. As described by Rothstein and
Uslaner (2006) in some countries parents "buy" their children's way into good schools, especially universities,
and then pay even more for good grades.
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certiﬁcation services. Unless certiﬁcation costs are too high, all high quality and some low
quality sellers desire certiﬁcation. As accuracy increases, the high types continue to demand
certiﬁcation - if anything, they will be better oﬀ. At the same time, the chances of low type
sellers securing a high ranking decrease, thus reducing their demand for certiﬁcation. As a
result, the total demand decreases. The same mechanism is, obviously, present also in my
model.
Another recent approach to the issues related to certiﬁcation is a work by Rosar and
Schulte (2010). The authors explore the trade-oﬀ between the quality of the generated
information and the participation level. They analyse the optimal certiﬁcation device from
a perspective of an information-loving receiver. In their setting, contrary to the papers
mentioned before and this work, the agents are risk averse and imperfectly informed about
their own type. The optimal device needs to balance two eﬀects, the information quality
provided by the test and self-revelation through diﬀerences in participation rates between
the types. Therefore the optimal device is often imperfect. If the test is too accurate, an
information-averse individual may refrain from taking the test. The authors consider only a
costless technology, which signiﬁcantly aﬀects the results.
Models of imperfect certiﬁcation can be viewed as a simpliﬁcation of noisy signalling
models. In this class of models, diﬀerential rates (between high and low type) of being
seen as a high type (by the employer) in equilibrium are driven by diﬀerences in eﬀort costs
between the types satisfying the single crossing condition. In a certiﬁcation setting this
property is reduced to a stochastic, exogenous, type-dependant truth-revealing mechanism.
The relation between signalling eﬀort, monetary costs of education and education decisions
is studied Chapter 3 of this thesis. The main focus is on the level of substitutability between
the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of education conditional on the quality of the signal.
Finally, the last source of inspiration for this paper is the recent interest in explaining
numerous aspects of policy preferences through self conﬁrming beliefs based on World Value
Survey (WVS) results. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006) have
found a correlation between one item of the questionnaire - a belief that it is luck rather
than hard work that determines economic outcomes - and the share of social expenditure
as a proportion of GDP. The authors have, independently, proposed a causal mechanisms
in which the societal beliefs are self-conﬁrming. Both models show that in countries where
the belief in the role of luck is high, the share of public expenditure to GDP is high. Here,
I show a similar eﬀect of beliefs on the total enrolment rate in CEE.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2.2 I present the the model and the key
assumptions. Section 2.3 describes the eﬀect of the relaxation of exogenous capacity con-
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straints on the education system. I ﬁrst show an equilibrium with ﬁxed enrolment quotas
(administrative capacity constraints) and then the equilibrium with the constraints relaxed.
Subsequently the welfare implications of the relaxation of those constraints are discussed.
Diﬀerences between certiﬁcation and licensing are discussed in Subsection 2.3.4. Since the
basic model assumes only one type of jobs, multiple job types with supermodularities in job-
worker matching are explored in Subsection 2.3.5. Section 2.4 discusses the eﬀects of short
term supply inelasticities once the capacity constraints are lifted; the existence of equilibria
multiplicity is shown. Section 2.5 brieﬂy discusses the relation between diﬀerent possible
equilibria and beliefs in the role of luck in determining economic outcomes in Central and
Eastern Europe. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The model
This section introduces the setup.
2.2.1 Agents
I assume a continuum of privately informed risk neutral agents of mass 1. The agents diﬀer
in productivity, and they can be of type θ ∈ Θ = {θH , θL}. I standardise the values to
θH = 1 and θL = 0. This double standardisation allows to interpret all other parameters in
a convenient metric - a proportion of a diﬀerence in lifetime products between high and low
types.7
The proportion of high types is a public information and is set to λ ∈ [0, 1]. The agents
will be sometimes referred to as students and test takers throughout the text.
The agents can disclose their type only through voluntary enrolment at a certiﬁcation
institution. Throughout the text a word university will be used as a synonym, but the range
of applications stretches to other forms of certiﬁcation. The certiﬁcation institution serves
only testing purposes and provides no human or social capital gains. The agents make a
strategic decision di ∈ D = [0, 1], where 1 is to apply for a education at a private cost s if
accepted8, 0 otherwise. In-between values of di are interpreted as mixed strategies. The pri-
7If one wants to incorporate employer's learning in the model, θH − θL should be interpreted as an
expected diﬀerence in product delivered between high and low type in time before the true type is learned
(on the job) by the employer and the wages adjusted accordingly
8This cost could be interpreted as an opportunity cost of being at university. The fact that s > θL
implicitly assumes that education is related to an experience loss relatively to those who decide not to
undertake education. For other applications of the model one could interpret s as e.g. costs of preparing
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vate cost is not a transfer to the certiﬁer and is independent of certiﬁcation precision. Due to
access constraints, if the number of applications exceeds the certiﬁers' capacity, applications
are randomly selected for certiﬁcation.9 If the agents apply and get accepted, they undergo
a noisy test procedure which with certain probability p ∈ [0.5, 1] reveals their true type. I
assume a transparent testing procedure with voluntary participation, hence test results are
observable by the employer. However application decisions are private information, therefore
an employer can't see a diﬀerence between an agent not applying and one applying but not
being accepted for certiﬁcation. For clarity, by enrolment I mean taking the test, which is
not equivalent to application, since, due to access constraints, not all application can be
accepted.10
The number of agents in the economy implies that a decision of an individual i has only
an inﬁnitesimal eﬀect on the aggregate application rate. Therefore, I deﬁne q as an aggregate
application rate of low type agents and m as the aggregate application rate of the high type.
The total application rate is deﬁned as Ω ≡ m ∗ λ+ q ∗ (1− λ).
2.2.2 Certiﬁers (Universities)
I assume a single, non strategic certiﬁcation institution, which oﬀers certiﬁcation to all
applicants subject to it's capacity constraints. The certiﬁcation technology is binary i.e.
the certiﬁer issues only pass and fail certiﬁcates. Pass certiﬁcate can be interpreted as a
university degree. The probabilities of false positive and false negative results are equal
and exogenous as presented in Table 2. The symmetry condition is not required for the
results, but it signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes the analysis. The exogeneity assumption may sound
strict, however, universities are usually exogenously ﬁnanced from public purse and the level
product documentation for certiﬁcation.
9This assumption of lack of screening technology and the use of a lottery instead is strong, however, it
ﬁts the CEE before 1990s. Positive discrimination of working class was a part of social policy. Applicants
from low income farming and working class background had their admission requirements lowered, compared
to other social classes. At the same time the admission restrictions, in particular on non-technical faculties
were a part of social engineering. Moreover, in every country, there are dimensions orthogonal to the innate
abilities that aﬀect the university admission but not (or to a lesser extend) the ﬁnal university degree like
the parents wealth and education.
10One could think of diﬀerent testing procedures. The possible variations are mandatory (as opposed to
voluntary) testing, which would be appropriate for analysis of compulsory education. Another possibility is
opaque (as opposed to transparent) testing, i.e. strategic individual decisions on disclosure of test taking
decision (possibility of hiding the negative test result). See Rosar and Schulte (2011) for a discussion in a
world with costless certiﬁcation technology. Note that their results do not always hold when agents bear
certiﬁcation costs.
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of expenditure indirectly deﬁnes the certiﬁcation quality. I assume that the government
covers the exogenous cost c per each certiﬁcate issued (either pass or fail). The government
subsidy is the only source of university ﬁnancing. In Section 2.4 I will explore the eﬀects
of endogenous quality, where, with ﬁxed per capita ﬁnancing, the quality decreases with a
sudden growth in the use of educational resources.
Table 2. Certiﬁcation Probabilities
High Type Low Type
Pr(Pass) p 1-p
Pr(Fail) 1- p p
The certiﬁer's capacity is exogenously ﬁxed to φ. If the total number of applications
exceeds the number of places oﬀered, the university randomly draws those to be accepted
for certiﬁcation. Acceptance rate δ(Ω) is simply an inverse of an applications to slots ratio.
If the number of applications increases, for a given level of φ, the probability of being
accepted decreases. Therefore, the higher the capacity of certiﬁcation system φ, the higher
the acceptance rate for a given level of applications. If the number of applications is lower
than the number of slots, all of those who apply get accepted. Formally the acceptance rate
is deﬁned as:
δ(Ω) =
{
1 if q = 0 and m = 0
min( φ
Ω
, 1) otherwise
(2.2.1)
The capacity constraints are lifted in Subsection 2.3.2. In Section 2.4 the certiﬁcation quality
is endogenised.
2.2.3 Employers
I assume perfectly competitive employers compete in wages in a Bertrand Fashion. Employers
learn the aggregate enrolment rate Ω. Their only information about the job applicants is the
certiﬁcate received from the certiﬁcation institute or lack of thereof. I specify strategies and
beliefs in three information sets. µP , µF and µU represent a probability that an individual
passing presenting a pass (P ), fail (F ) or no certiﬁcate (U) is of high quality. Similarly I
deﬁne wage oﬀers wP , wF and wU paid to the workers depending on the signal received.
2.2.4 Timing
I consider the following timing of the game. First nature allocates the productivity levels
among agents and the certiﬁcation quality p and the public and private costs c and s are
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set. Subsequently, agents make their application decisions. Once the admission decisions are
made and the results of the test announced, employers perfectly observe the test results and
make take-it-or-leave oﬀers to the workers on a competitive labour market. The timeline
is presented in Figure 2.2. In the ﬁrst stage the agents make a decision whether to apply
for a certiﬁcate or not. Proportion m of high types and proportion q of low types decides
to do so. Those who choose certiﬁcation enter a stage in which a random selection for
certiﬁcation takes place. With the acceptance probability δ agents undertake a test which
with probability p reveals their true type. With probability 1 − δ agents are not accepted
to the university and end up in a pool of uncertiﬁed agents together with those who did not
apply for certiﬁcation. In a scenario in which the capacity constraints are lifted (δ = 1), all
who apply undergo certiﬁcation.
Nature
chooses θ
Agents
enrol
Nature
decides
on admissions
Universities
issue certiﬁcates
Employers
set wages
Pay-oﬀs
Figure 2.2: Timeline
2.2.5 Equilibrium concept
In the analysis, I employ a D1 reﬁnement of Nash equilibrium to solve the game, such
that the following sequence of actions hold. Certiﬁcation ﬁnancing rule is set. Students
take certiﬁcation decisions. Employers map their beliefs on student types into wage oﬀers.
Belief-strategy combination satisﬁes Bayes' rule whenever possible, and sequential rationality
always. D1 reﬁnement restricts the out-of-equilibrium beliefs. It requires that if the set of
receiver's responses for which one type of senders gains from deviating is larger than the
set for which a second type gains, then receiver's beliefs must assign zero probability to the
second type (Cho and Kreps (1987)). I solve the game by backward induction and start
with the strategies of the employers. For simplicity, I focus only on symmetric equilibria, in
which all agents of the same type act in the same way.
2.3 Eﬀects of Exogenous Certiﬁcation Access Constraints
In this section, I will show the eﬀect of exogenous certiﬁcation access constraints on individual
and social welfare in a setting with one type of job and in an extension with supermodularities
in job-worker match.
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2.3.1 Exogenous Access Constraints
Solving the game by backward induction I start with the employers and their wage oﬀers. The
competition between the employers sets the wage oﬀers equal to the expected productivity.
Given the assumption on the labour productivity between the types, the wages of agents
who are accepted for certiﬁcation and pass (subscript P ) or fail (F ) and those who decide
not to take the test (U) are equal to the beliefs for each of the signals and are given by the
following
µP (p, q,m) =
pmλ
(1− p)q(1− λ) + pmλ = wP (p, q,m) (2.3.1)
µF (p, q,m) =
(1− p)mλ
pq(1− λ) + (1− p)mλ = wF (p, q,m) (2.3.2)
µU(p, q,m) =
λ(1−mδ(Ω))
(1− λ)(1− qδ(Ω)) + λ(1−mδ(Ω)) = wU(p, q,m) (2.3.3)
wP and wF are, respectively, equal to the proportion of high types in the pool of students
who passed and failed the test. The acceptance rate δ(Ω) is deﬁned in Equation 2.2.1. wU is
the proportion of high types in the pool of agents that did not take any test. The employer
can not distinguish between agents who were not accepted and those who did not apply.
To perform the analysis it is useful to deﬁne the expected payoﬀs conditional on being
accepted to a university for both types, given by:
EwH(q,m, p) = p ∗ wP (p, q,m) + (1− p) ∗ wF (p, q,m)− s
EwL(q,m, p) = (1− p) ∗ wP (p, q,m) + p ∗ wF (p, q,m)− s
Agents making their certiﬁcation decisions weigh the probability of getting the pass or
fail certiﬁcate (and the respective wages) at a certain cost s and compare it to their outside
option, refraining from education. When the agents are indiﬀerent between the two options
they choose di ∈ (0, 1). We can write students expected utilities, for both types, in the
following way:
UH(q,m, p, di) = di ∗ δ(Ω) ∗ EwH(q,m, p) + (1− di ∗ δ(Ω))wU(p, q,m) (2.3.4)
UL(q,m, p, di) = di ∗ δ(Ω) ∗ EwL(q,m, p) + (1− di ∗ δ(Ω)) ∗ wU(p, q,m) (2.3.5)
In words, whenever an agent makes a decision to enter the university, with probability δ(Ω)
she is admitted and gets the expected wage for a university graduate for a given type and
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pays the cost s. With probability 1− δ(Ω) she is not accepted by the university and remains
uncertiﬁed. If an agent decides not to apply for the certiﬁcation, she gets the wage of an
uncertiﬁed worker with certainty.
I impose the following assumptions:
A1 : s < 1− λ A2 : φ < λ A3 : 1/2 < p ≤ 1
A1 assures that a high type prefers perfect certiﬁcation to pooling on no certiﬁcation. A2
assures that access constraints are strict enough, such that not all high types can be certiﬁed
under the capacity constraints. The fact that p 6= 1/2 assures that the certiﬁcation is
informative. 1/2 < p is assumed just for consistence with the schooling terminology, the
same logic would apply if 0 ≤ p < 1/2 with the opposite interpretation of the test results.
Proposition 2.3.1. Whenever assumptions A1, A2 and A3 are fulﬁlled and p < 1 the
equilibrium is semi-pooling such that all high types (m = 1) and some, but not all, low types
(q ∈ (0, 1)) apply. For p = 1 , m = 1 and q = 0.
For proof see the Appendix.
Intuitively, in the described regime, the demand for university degrees exceeds the supply.
The agents that apply but are not admitted to the test are mixed with those who voluntary
refrain from certiﬁcation. The certiﬁcation capacity constraints lead to a loss of information
that could be acquired from voluntary decisions with no constraints. In the unique D1-robust
equilibrium of this game all high types always apply. The application rate of the low types
(denoted as q∗pre), together with application rates for the case with no capacity constraints
(q∗post) are presented graphically in Figure 2.3.
The information ﬂow from workers to employers is negatively aﬀected by the constraints.
However, as it will be shown in the next section the relaxation of the constraints, does not
necessary lead to an increase in utility of the high type agents.
2.3.2 Relaxation of Constraints
Now I will describe the economy after the relaxation of certiﬁcation constraints; φpost = 1.
Suppose that the authorities have decided to provide certiﬁcation to everyone who requests
it, keeping the same level of ﬁnancing per student. The relaxation of the student's quotas
sets δ(Ω) = 1 disregard of the application rate. All the remaining assumptions remain the
same.
From the employers' perspective the problem stays the same. At the stage they enter
the game all the parameters are known, therefore the pass and fail wages are given by
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Equation 2.3.1 and Equation 2.3.2. The wage of uncertiﬁed workers is given by Equation 2.3.3
with δ(Ω) = 1.
From the students' perspective the regime change does not change the economic problem
faced by them, however, it signiﬁcantly aﬀects the possible set of outcomes. First of all,
since all students can be accepted, if the results from the previous section hold, i.e. m = 1
the uncertiﬁed wage would decrease, lowering the low types outside option. Lowered outside
option increases the pressure on the low types to apply. Keeping in mind assumption A1 I
establish the following results.
Proposition 2.3.2. When there are no constraints and p < 1, all the good students enrol
(m = 1) and q ∈ [0, 1]. Equilibrium low type application rate is strictly higher than under
certiﬁcation constraints.
For proof see the Appendix
Interestingly, for high enough s and low enough p an equilibrium with the high type pay-
oﬀs lower than λ, i.e. lower than in the pooling equilibrium, can be supported in separating
equilibrium.
Figure 2.3 shows the equilibrium application rates of the low types in the two regimes for
diﬀerent values of s. As it can be seen, the application rate before transition is always lower
than after and both rates are weakly decreasing in certiﬁcation precision. The two coincide
and converge to zero only when the certiﬁcate is perfectly precise. In such a case none of the
low types applies. It can also be seen that for low values of p and s full participation of the
low types can be achieved in the regime without administrative constraints. This happens
only for s < λ and suﬃciently low p.
2.3.3 Welfare comparison
It is a standard characteristic of a certiﬁcation model,11 that from the welfare perspective
the high certiﬁcation rate equilibrium is strictly dominated by the low certiﬁcation rate
equilibrium. Given the assumptions, the total output and the total workers' remunerations
in both cases are equal to λ, but the total level of wasteful investment in certiﬁcation is
lower when the certiﬁcation rate is low. The total certiﬁcation cost ((c + s) ∗ δ ∗ Ω) is, by
construction, a pure social waste.12 It is more interesting to compare the utility of both
11At least in a simple standard with no modularities in a production / matching function
12Another potential social objective is fairness. It could be interpreted as decreasing the role of luck (e.g.
lifting the constraints) or assuring the wages reﬂect the true productivities. As it is shown in this section,
pursuing this objective does not always result in maximising welfare of the high types.
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(a) s = 0.05 (b) s = 0.1
(c) s = 0.3
Figure 2.3: Low type equilibrium enrolment rate as a function of p for diﬀerent levels of s
and λ = 0.25 and φ = 0.15 with (q∗pre) and without (q
∗
post) capacity constraints
types between the two regimes. The relaxation of exogenous capacity constraints clearly has
an ambiguous eﬀect. Although, it allows everyone to undergo the certiﬁcation, it increases
the proportion of the low types in the pool of certiﬁed agents lowering the wages.
Proposition 2.3.3. Low types, for 1/2 < p < 1, are always worse oﬀ when the capacity
constraints are lifted. High types are also worse oﬀ if p is not suﬃciently high. Since
certiﬁcation is a pure social waste the social welfare is maximised for φ = 0.
For the proof see the Appendix.
The relaxation of the constraints implies higher number of students and hence higher
amount of private resources spent on education. As a result, the total pool divided between
the agents decreases. Figure 2.4 presents the range of parameters for which high type beneﬁts
from the regime change (white area) in a numerical example. This happens only if the level
of c and the resulting low levels of p are suﬃciently high. At the same time there is a wide
range of parameters where high types only lose on relaxation of the constraints (black area).
In this range of parameters the crowding out eﬀect of low types entering education (due
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to the value of their outside option) has a dominant role. In other words the expansion of
tertiary education can be beneﬁcial only if suﬃciently high quality level is assured.
Figure 2.4: Eﬀect of regime change on high type's welfare for λ = 0.25 and φ = 0.15
2.3.4 Licensing
Licensure, although similar to professional certiﬁcation, is characterized by one key diﬀer-
ence. In contrast to a certiﬁcate, a license is a legal requirement for practising a profession.
Therefore a failure of being granted a license is much more than just a bad signal about the
quality. Those who do not receive a license are not allowed to practice. In the modelling
framework presented above licensing implies that wF = wU = 0. This equality holds dis-
regard of the access constraints. As a result, the relaxation of access constraints does not
change the expected wage of those who fail the certiﬁcation, and, therefore, the low type
incentives to apply remain unchanged. The low type's application rates before and after the
relaxation of the constraints remain the same, but, obviously, the number of licensed agents
will change. Therefore improved access to certiﬁcation is purely beneﬁcial for both the high
and the low types.
2.3.5 Licensing and multiple job types
Since signaling is considered a pure waste, any improvements in access to certiﬁcation lead
to a (weak) decrease in social welfare. The situation changes when we consider more than
one type of jobs and supermodularities in job-worker matching. One of realistic examples
is a situation that stands as a rationale behind licensing is a case in which a person of low
abilities performing a job that is subject to licensing may cause signiﬁcant damage to buyers
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of the services (e.g. doctors, lawyers or brokers). Suppose now that there exist two types of
jobs j ∈ {l, h}. A job-worker match will be denoted by θi,j where i ∈ {H,L} denotes the
worker's type. For a standard job (denoted by superscript l no certiﬁcates are required and
the productivity of high and low types stays the same as in the previous parts (i.e. θHl = 1
and θLl = 0, the ﬁrst subscript represents the worker's type and the second one the job's
type). In order to perform the diﬃcult job (denoted by h) a certiﬁcate is required and on
the job productivity is given by θHh and θLh for the high and low type respectively. In order
to follow more closely the doctors example I assume that the worker-job matching function
exhibits the following property θHh > θHl and θLl > θLh.
13
Conjecture 2.3.1. When the certiﬁcation quality is low it is optimal to set the constraints
to 0 (φ = 0). When the quality is suﬃciently high it is optimal to relax the constraints
(φ = 1). For lower values of certiﬁcation precision there exists an intermediate level of
access constraints φ ∈ (0, 1) that maximises social welfare.
Although analytical proof can not be shown due to algebraical complexities, I will provide
the intuition supported with a graphical example.
Social welfare is given by the following:
SW (φ) =λ(θHl + p(θHh − θHl)δ(φ, q∗(φ))) + (1− λ)(θLl + (1− p)(θLh − θLl)q∗(φ)δ(φ, q∗(φ)))
− (λ+ (1− λ) ∗ q∗(φ)) ∗ δ(φ, q∗(φ)) ∗ (c+ s)
In words, it is the sum of all productivities for both types weighted by the probability of a
given job-worker match net of the sum of private and public cost of certiﬁcation. Whenever
the access constraint is binding (i.e. φ < λ+ q∗ ∗ (1− λ), where q∗, the low type equilibrium
enrolment rate is a function of φ and all other parameters) an increase in φ leads to an
increase in q∗ due to the mechanism presented in the previous section.
The impact of change in φ is a sum of three eﬀects. The ﬁrst one is the change in access
of the high types to certiﬁcation net of increase in certiﬁcation costs (c + s). The eﬀect of
the change is positive, however, one has to keep in mind that the eﬀect of the increase in
access due to increases in the number of slots δφ(φ, q
∗(φ)) is mitigated by the crowding out
eﬀect due to an increase in low types application rate q∗
′
(φ)δq(φ, q(φ)). The second eﬀect is
the decrease in social welfare due to increased number of low types accepted for diﬃcult jobs
due to increased application rate and it is clearly negative. Finally, the third eﬀect, of an
13Standard supermodularity condition is given by θHh + θLl > θHl + θLh, however it is reasonable to
assume that the productivity of the high type on an diﬃcult job is higher than on a standard job. Moreover,
to justify licensing I assume that the low type on advanced job can only do harm.
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ambiguous sign, is the change to the low type acceptance rate due to joint eﬀect of higher
application rate and increased number of slots. Because of those complexities the analytical
solution for q∗ is not feasible.
The overall eﬀect of change in φ on social welfare depends on all parameters and is
presented graphically in Figure 2.5 (thick line, and Y-axis on the left hand side). On the
same ﬁgure a dashed line represents the equilibrium low type enrolment rate (with the Y-axis
on the right hand side of the plot). For the plot, the following parameter values have been
used: θHH = 2, θHL = 1, θLL = 0, θLH = −1, s = 0.1, c = 0.1, λ = 0.25.
It's immediate that when the certiﬁcation is inﬁnitesimally informative, given the as-
sumptions, the social welfare is maximised when φ = 0. This can be seen on the left panel
of Figure 2.5, where the social welfare is maximised when no-one is allowed to take certiﬁca-
tion. Increase in φ leads to an increase in q∗ and resulting decrease in social welfare. When
certiﬁcation is perfect (the right panel), it's immediate that only high types apply and any
level of access constraints φ ≥ λ maximises social welfare. As it can be seen on the right
panel, for higher levels of φ access constraints are not binding since the low types decide
not to enter university. Situation is more interesting for intermediate levels of p (central
panel). Although, the low type application rate is increasing over the whole range if φ, the
social welfare is increasing for low values of φ and decreasing for high values of φ. When the
constraints are very tight the eﬀect of an increase in access for the high types outweighs the
crowding out eﬀect. The plot allows to make a statement that, there exists an open set of
parameters in which there exists a socially optimal level of access constraints, φ ∈ (0, 1).
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(a) p = 0.5 (b) p = 0.9
(c) p = 1
Figure 2.5: Social welfare and low type's application rate for θHH = 2, θHL = 0, θLL = 0,
θLH = −1, s = 0.1, λ = 0.25 and diﬀerent values of p as a function of access constraints φ
2.4 Eﬀect of Exogenous and Endogenous Certiﬁcation
Access Constraints
In this section I analyse the case where, in addition to administrative access constraints,
there exist endogenous constraints in form of supply inelasticities.14
As discussed in the introduction, it's natural to think of quasi-bottlenecks in response to
a huge change in demand, at least in the short run.
Suppose, there exists an explicit link between the public expenditure per student s and
the quality of universities. This link, that incorporates the supply inelasticities, is deﬁned
through the unit cost function χ(Ωδ(q,m), p) per certiﬁcate issued. The cost function is
assumed to meet the following:
14Another, unfortunately, quite realistic, but less subtle approach of modelling endogenous constraints
would be to assume that the government, while keeping the same aggregate level of ﬁnancing increases the
number of students admitted. In such a case, the increase in the number of students would result in decrease
in per student expenditure.
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A4 : χ(Ωδ(Ω), p = 0.5) = 0 A5 : χ1(Ωδ(Ω), p) > 0 A6 : χ2(Ωδ(Ω), p) > 0
A7 : χ(Ωδ(Ω), p)is bounded
The digit in the subscript indicates the argument with respect to which a derivative is
taken. A4 assures that the cost of providing a completely uninformative test is zero. A5 is
the key assumption in this chapter, which implies negative externalities of enrolling students
imposed on certiﬁcation precision. A6 is a natural assumption that states, simply, that the
cost of certiﬁcation precision is increasing with precision. A7 assures that there exists a fee
c that can buy perfect certiﬁcation disregard of the enrolment rate. A case equivalent to
χ1(Ωδ(Ω), p) = 0 is analysed in Subsection 2.3.2
15. For graphical illustration, the following
cost function is used throughout the text
χ(p,Ω) = α
(
Ωδ(Ω)
φ
)γ
(p− 0.5)2 (2.4.1)
where φ is the capacity constraint prior to the relaxation and γ ≥ 0 is interpreted as a
measure of short term supply inelasticities. When γ = 0 there are only exogenous access
constraints, i.e. the the situation is analogous to the previous section. The higher γ the
lower the quality level for a given level of public education expenditure c and given raise in
the enrolment rate. To highlight the short term inelasticities, I assume that the certiﬁcation
cost depends on the enrolment rate relative to the initial capacity (before the relaxation of
the constraint). Before the transition, the total number of students (Ωδ(Ω)) never exceeds
φ. When the administrative constraints are lifted (δ(Ω) = 1), the cost depends on the rate
of growth of number of delivered certiﬁcates relatively to initial capacity constraints. This
assumption is aimed at capturing the costs of adjusting from one equilibrium to another,
and can be interpreted as a short term supply curve.
Supply inelasticities play a signiﬁcant role in determining the outcomes of this game.
Contrary to the previous case, certiﬁcation quality depends not only directly on c but also
on the total number of registered agents Ω. As a result the enrolment rates of the two types
aﬀect the individual decision in two ways. The ﬁrst eﬀect is as in the baseline case, through
the proportion of types in diﬀerent pools of students. The second channel is via negative
externalities from enrolment. Since the enrolment decisions are made only after the ﬁnancing
level c is announced, the certiﬁcation quality is not known ex ante by the agents. Due to the
supply inelasticities, the higher the number of registered students, the lower the quality. As
15In this case an exogenous cost c uniquely deﬁnes p.
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an example, the eﬀect of change in low types' application rate on low types expected utility
after the relaxation of access constraints is given by (Equation 2.4.2). Analogical analysis
can be performed for the the changes in m and for the eﬀect on UH .
∂UL
∂q
= (wF − wP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
∂p
∂q︸︷︷︸
<0︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ p
p ∂wF∂q︸︷︷︸
<0
+
∂wF
∂p︸︷︷︸
<0
dp
dq︸︷︷︸
<0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0/>0
+ (1− p)
p ∂wP∂q︸︷︷︸
<0
+
∂wP
∂p︸︷︷︸
>0
dp
dq︸︷︷︸
<0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(2.4.2)
The change of the low type enrolment rate aﬀects those who enrol in three ways. The ﬁrst
one is the eﬀect of the certiﬁcation quality change due to change in enrolment rates on the
expected wage of the low type. For a given fee, an increase in enrolment decreases the
certiﬁcation quality, which leads to an increase in the low types' expected wage. The second
eﬀect is the impact of enrolment rate on the fail wage, which is ambiguous. On the one
hand an increase in q decreases it. At the same time a decrease in p caused by the supply
inelasticities leads to an increase in wF . The third eﬀect, of change in q on the pass wage, is
clearly negative, both through the higher number of low types attempting the test and the
lowered quality of the test. Similar reasoning has to be undertaken for the high type and for
the the high types participation.
The analysis is performed in a similar fashion to the previous section. First I describe
an equilibrium in a scenario when both endogenous and exogenous constraints coexist. In
the second scenario, the administrative capacity constraints are lifted and only the supply
inelasticities exist. This scenario will be referred to as the transition regime.
2.4.1 Both Constraints
In this case, as I will show, the introduction of endogenous capacity constraints in a form
described above does not change the outcomes from the scenario without endogenous con-
straints. The results are still valid (given Assumptions 1 and 2).
Proposition 2.4.1. Endogenous capacity constraints do not aﬀect the equilibria when ex-
ogenous constraints are binding.
For proof see the Appendix
The certiﬁcation system always works, in equilibrium, at it's full capacity φ, therefore
agents can perfectly infer the quality. As a result the change of the cost function has no
eﬀect on the outcomes. However, once the exogenous constraints are lifted, the results will
change, as shown in the next section.
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2.4.2 Relaxation of the Exogenous Constraints
In this section I analyse the eﬀect of endogenous capacity constraints once the exogenous
constraints are lifted. In such a case they truly aﬀect the economy. Contrary to the previous
case, here, the low types can coordinate thanks to which new equilibria emerge. It's clear
that the endogenous capacity constraints negatively aﬀect the welfare of the high types. For
any level of tuition subsidy c and Ω > φ the resulting certiﬁcation quality is lower than in the
case without the supply inelasticity. The possibility of the low types to aﬀect the education
quality leads to an interesting result, a multiplicity of equilibria.
Conjecture 2.4.1. When the certiﬁcation provision cost function satisﬁes the assumptions
A5 to A7, multiple equilibria with diﬀerent education quality and enrolment rate exist. The
ﬁnal outcome depends on the prior beliefs on the education quality.
A clear analytical proof of the proposition is not feasible, therefore a numerical analysis
will be presented instead. The result follows directly from Equation 2.4.2 presenting a dif-
ferentiation of UL with respect to q. The ambiguous eﬀect may lead to multiple equilibria
depending on the initial beliefs on the enrolment rates. It does not, however change the
result achieved in the previous regimes that m = 1. For some parameters high types receive
in equilibrium less than λ.
Numerical Example
I will present a numerical analysis for the cost function deﬁned in (Equation 2.4.1). I
will present, in details, all equilibria for a special case with (λ = 0.25, φ = 0.15, α = 0.3 and
γ = 1).16
Analysing the change of UL, we can identify 6 cases in which, in equilibrium, the high
types always enrol and the low types optimal decision depends on the parameter range. The
graphical representation of the equilibria types can be found in Figure 2.6, Figure 2.7 and
Figure 2.8. Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7 depict the same result from diﬀerent perspectives, as a
function of low type enrolment rate or certiﬁcation precision. The two, for a ﬁxed level of c
are clearly interconnected, however, the story behind the two beliefs is diﬀerent. The thin line
in Figure 2.6 depicts the expected utility of the low type as a function of low type enrolment
rate q conditional on m = 1 (solid line) and the certiﬁcation quality for a given low types'
enrolment (dashed line). The values of c and s diﬀer between the analysed cases. Whenever,
16This set of parameters implies that perfect certiﬁcation under exogenous capacity constraints costs 7.5%
of future product (throughout the life, after graduation) of a high type. Under full enrolment, perfect
certiﬁcation is almost prohibitively high and would require the input of c = 0.5
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for a given value of q, utility is positive, it is optimal for the low type to enrol. However,
than it's optimal for all low types, therefore full low type enrolment rate is an equilibrium,
whenever low types utility remains positive for q = 1. Whenever, for a given level of q low
type's utility is negative, it's optimal not to enrol. q = 0 is sustained in equilibrium only,
when c is suﬃciently high, such that when only high types, perfect certiﬁcation is assured.
Another equilibria exist for such values of q that the low types are indiﬀerent between the
enrolment and staying without a certiﬁcate.
Figure 2.7 presents ex post realisation of certiﬁcation quality (by construction, equivalent
to beliefs on the role of luck in determining outcomes) given the ex ante beliefs (horizontal
axis) and best responses of all players. If the low type agents believe that the luck plays an
important role they expect other agents to enrol which drives the certiﬁcation quality down.
At the same time, if they believe that luck plays only a limited role, the certiﬁcation precision
remains high. This ﬁgure is derived directly from Figure 2.6. For the anticipated certiﬁcation
precision levels that give low types positive utility one can expect full enrolment and hence the
resulting certiﬁcation precision. For anticipated precision that leads to negative utility one
can expect zero enrolment rate of the low types. The equilibria are given by intersections of
the line of ex-post certiﬁcation precision (thick line) and the 45 ◦ (dashed line) line. Figure 2.8
presents the area of existence of diﬀerent equilibrium types on cs space for diﬀerent values
of α.
A short description of the 6 cases is presented below.
1. For low values c and s (the bottom left dark gray and light gray area next to it
in Figure 2.817) the utility of the low type is decreasing in q but stays positive (
Figure 2.6(a)). Hence, there is a single equilibrium with full enrolment. Similarly, when
looking at Figure 2.7(a) the agents know that, disregard of the anticipated quality, all
low types will enrol and drive the quality to the lowest level p(M = 1, f). In the light
gray area in Figure 2.8 the high types' equilibrium utility is lower than λ.
2. For moderate values of c and low values of s (dark gray and white areas in the top
left corner of Figure 2.8) there exist two stable equilibria with q = 0 and q = 1 (
Figure 2.6(b) and Figure 2.7(a)). In addition, there is one unstable equilibrium such
that q ∈ (0, 1). In this case, perfect certiﬁcation is attainable for low levels of low type
enrolment. Hence, the expected wage is zero (the ﬂat part of the UL curve). If agents
anticipate that the enrolment rate is low, they don't enrol. For higher enrolment levels
the eﬀect of the decrease in certiﬁcation quality is strong, leading to positive utility for
17The described areas are easiest to identify on the third plot, for α = 0.5
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(a) s = 0.05 and c = 0.05 (b) s = 0.1 and c = 0.15
(c) s = 0.2 and c = 0.15 (d) s = 0.25 and c = 0.05
(e) s = 0.25 and c = 0.15 (f) s = 0.24 and c = 0.123
Figure 2.6: Low type utility as a function of q for λ = 0.25 and φ = 0.15 and α = 0.3
higher values of beliefs. Therefore for high enough q the optimal decision is to enrol.
If the low types coordinate on q = 1 and the values of c and s are in the white area on
the plot the high types receive in equilibrium utility lower than λ.
3. For moderate values of c and s (black and small very light grey area east of it on
Figure 2.8) 3 equilibria exist with q = 0 and with two values of q ∈ (0, 1) ( Figure 2.6(c)
and Figure 2.7(c)). The utility function is initially increasing in q and becomes positive
for moderate values. For higher values of q, the negative impact of increased number
of low types with certiﬁcates on the wage becomes stronger than the beneﬁts from
the decreased quality induced by the increase in enrolment rate. The expected utility
starts to decrease becoming negative for high values of q. The two equilibria with
positive enrolment are deﬁned by the intersections of UL curve and the horizontal axis.
For the highest low type equilibrium enrolment rate the high types receive less than λ
for c and s in the light gray area.
4. For low values of c and high values of s (light grey and gray areas in the bottom right
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(a) s = 0.05 and c = 0.05 (b) s = 0.1 and c = 0.15
(c) s = 0.2 and c = 0.15 (d) s = 0.25 and c = 0.05
(e) s = 0.25 and c = 0.15 (f) s = 0.24 and c = 0.123
Figure 2.7: Ex post and ex ante certiﬁcation precision p for q for λ = 0.25 and φ = 0.15 and
α = 0.3 and diﬀerent c and s
corner in Figure 2.8) there exist one equilibrium with q ∈ (0, 1) ( Figure 2.6(d) and
Figure 2.7(d)). The case is analogous to the one in Figure 2.6(a). The utility is strictly
decreasing in q. However the higher value of s causes that the utility is positive
for low values of q and negative for high values. Therefore the only equilibrium is
the intersection of the UL curve and the horizontal axis. In the light gray area the
equilibrium payoﬀ of the high type is smaller than λ.
5. For high values of c and s (gray area in the top right corner) there exist one equilibrium
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(a) α = 0.1 (b) α = 0.3
(c) α = 0.5
Figure 2.8: Equilibria range on c− s space for λ = 0.25, φ = 0.15 and diﬀerent levels of α
with q = 0 ( Figure 2.6(e) and Figure 2.7(e)). Low types utility from enrolment is
always negative disregard of the enrolment rate. The inverted U-shape indicates that
the eﬀect of certiﬁcation quality is strong, but due to high costs s insuﬃcient to make
the utility positive.
6. For moderate values of c and s (very small gray area at the bottom tip of the black area
in Figure 2.8) three equilibria with q ∈ (0, 1) exist ( Figure 2.6(f) and Figure 2.7(f)).
This case clearly shows the interplay of the two eﬀects. Even or very low values of q
the certiﬁcation is imperfect. For q close to zero even the fail wage is high, therefore
the low types may expect high utility. However, as the enrolment increases the fail
wage goes signiﬁcantly down bringing the UL below zero. At this point the certiﬁcation
quality decrease eﬀect comes into play moving the curve in the positive range again.
Finally for high values of q the quantity eﬀect dominates. The three equilibria are
given by the intersections of the UL curve and the horizontal axis.
The analysis so far shows that supply inelasticities may result in multiplicity of equilibria.
This model shows that the change of the enrolment rate may be an eﬀect of diﬀerences in
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beliefs in the role of luck in determining the educational outcomes. If such beliefs are held
by the society, the low types coordinate and drive the quality of education down, fulﬁlling
their beliefs.
The welfare analysis will be skipped, the eﬀect of γ > 0 is clear. The higher the cost of
certiﬁcation provision the lower the certiﬁcation precision which results in decreased utility
of the high types and increase in low types wasteful participation.
2.5 Discussion
The model presented suggests that there may exist a relationship between beliefs in the role
of luck in determining educational outcomes and data on tertiary education enrolment rates
in countries that experienced a relaxation of constraints such as those in Central and Eastern
Europe in 1990s. Though the concept of beliefs is a bit vague, there have been attempts
to quantify it. One such attempt is the World Value Survey, which asks the respondents
to assess the following statement. "In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life.
Or, hard work does not generally bring success; it's more a matter of luck and connections."
The answers are coded from 1 to 10, where 10 implies the highest belief in the role of luck
and connections. Since, in the presented setting, universities exist only for certiﬁcation
purposes, these beliefs coincide with the beliefs on the education quality. The higher the
role of luck, the higher the probability of the low type of being certiﬁed as a high type. The
survey question is more general than the type of beliefs analysed in the model. The beliefs on
education quality do not necessary coincide with the beliefs on the role of luck in other ﬁelds,
therefore direct inference from the data is not a perfect test of the model. Nevertheless, the
correlation shown on the Figure below may be read as a support for the hypothesis stated
in this paper.
Figure 2.9 shows positive correlation between belief in the role of luck and total tertiary
education enrolment rates in 19 CEE countries18. As it can be seen, the higher the role of
luck, the higher the enrolment rates.19
18All CEE countries for which the data was available.
19The enrolment rate is deﬁned here as the number of students registered at university relatively to the
population in age group 20-24.
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Figure 2.9: Correlation between average tertiary education gross enrolment rates in years
2002-2008 and a belief that luck and connections determine outcomes
2.6 Conclusions
The key message of this study is that relaxing access constraints to higher education can be
harmful even for those who, without the growth of the university sector, would stay outside
the education if a suﬃciently high quality of education was not provided. Policy goals aiming
solely at increasing participation in higher education such as those stated in the EU's Europe
2020 strategy20 may have adverse welfare consequences.
When access constraints are binding, not all high ability individuals receive a chance to
get a university degree. As a result, some of them remain in the pool of uneducated workers.
Improved access decreases the proportion of agents with high abilities that don't enter the
university and hence, negatively aﬀects the expected wage of those that choose not to obtain
the university education. Consequently, when university degrees are not perfect signals of
student abilities, the less able face stronger incentives to game the system in order to try
to get a degree. Higher low type enrolment rate reduces the self-selection component of the
informativeness of university degrees.
The negative eﬀect of improving access, when the informativeness of degrees is low, is
magniﬁed when there exist supply inelasticities and when the certiﬁcation quality decreases
with the number of certiﬁcates issued, when per student expenditure are ﬁxed. This can
20 The document states two key policy objectives in the ﬁeld of education. These are reducing the school
dropout rates to below 10 %, with at least 40 % of 3034-year-olds completing tertiary education.
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lead to a vicious circle in which an increase in enrolment rates leads to a decrease in quality
of certiﬁcation. As the low ability agents' chances to get a degree increase, the demand
for certiﬁcation also increases driving the quality further down. The inelasticities lead to
a multiplicity of equilibria and the equilibrium selected depends on societal beliefs about
education quality.
One of the possible applications of the model is an analysis of the changes in the higher
education enrolment rates in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism.
In that region, universities used to operate at low capacity. The liberalisation of the educa-
tion system accompanying the economic transition, together with the change in the structure
of labour demand led to a sudden jump in the demand for higher education. Enrolment rates
were increasing despite growing concerns about university quality and have reached or ex-
ceeded those in Western Europe. This paper presents a self-perpetuating mechanism, in
which the enrolment rates and education quality interact that can explain the phenomenon.
The model shows that, when the university system operates with short term capacity con-
straints, an increase in demand with ﬁxed ﬁnancing rules, leads to a decrease in certiﬁcation
quality, which in turn increases the less able agents' demand for certiﬁcation.
The results lead to some policy recommendations. First of all, when improving access
to education the authorities should focus on assuring high quality of education. General
availability or freedom to choose education are deﬁnitely desirable but, as the model shows,
could possibly be detrimental for society if a suﬃciently high quality level is not assured.
Another ﬁnding is that private education costs help agents self-select and partially improve
information revelation. The model, however, does not suggest that higher education should
not be provided free of charge. An alternative, and widely supported model of education
ﬁnancing, the mean-tested loan system, would assure free education at the point of use (see
e.g. Barr (2004) and Jacobs and Van Der Ploeg (2006)) and would not be pure tax-ﬁnancing.
However, given the economic instability in the region, aversion towards ﬁnancial institutions
caused by the economic turmoil during the transition and general risk aversion there are
serious risks regarding the applicability of the idea.
Another possible solution for mitigating the possible adverse welfare eﬀects of the huge
increase in demand is in the regulation of admissions. Instead of a complete relaxation of
admission caps, a smooth transition through a gradual increase in the number of places
would be recommended. Similar measures are currently under discussion in CEE countries.
For example the Polish parliament has recently passed a bill imposing a requirement that an
approval from Ministry of Education is required for an increase in enrolment at a university
exceeding 2%.
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Appendix - Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1
Proof. The agents optimisation problem can be written as the following
max
di∈[0,1]
Ui(p, q,m, di) (2.6.1)
Agents of a given type choose to apply whenever the expected wage of a university student
net of costs exceeds the wage of the uncertiﬁed agents.
It is immediate that, whenever certiﬁcation is perfect (p = 1), all high types who apply
and get accepted receive 1 − s. Assumption 1 ensures that the decision to apply in such a
case, dominates the possible coordination on m = 0. Low types, if apply and get accepted,
receive −s for sure, therefore m = 1 and q = 0 must be the equilibrium.
For lower levels of certiﬁcation precision, the situation is more complex. Firstly, I will
show that m = 1 and q∗ ∈ (0, 1) and consistent beliefs form an equilibrium and subsequently
I will rule out all other possibilities.
Suppose m = 1. Since all good students apply, given the Assumption 2, the acceptance
rate δ(Ω) < 1 assures that some of the good students enter the pool of untested workers
driving the uncertiﬁed wage above 0. To determine the optimal application rate of low types
note that if both m = 1 and q = 1, the proportions of high types and low types in the pool
of certiﬁed and uncertiﬁed students are the same, hence UL(di = 0, q = 1,m = 1) = λ. Since
for any level of p > 0.5 the test is informative, UL(di = 1, q = 1,m = 1) < λ. So it can't
be that all the low types apply. At the same time UL(di = 1, q = 0,m = 1) = 1, therefore
it can't be that none of the low types applies. From continuity of wU , wP and wF there
must exist 0 < q∗ < 1 such that UL(di = 1, q = q∗,m = 1) = UL(di = 0, q = q∗,m = 1).
Assumption 2 guarantees that this value is strictly positive. In such a case an action dL = q
∗
and consistent beliefs µi(q) fully concentrated on q
∗ form the best response. For any level
of µi(q) high types holding beliefs µi(m) = 1 ﬁnd it optimal to apply, therefore the belief
system µi(q) = q
∗ and µi(m) = 1 and individual strategies dL = q∗ and dH = 1 form an
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equilibrium. The closed form solution of the equilibrium value of q∗ exists but the degree of
polynomial solving the indiﬀerence condition makes it diﬃcult to present the result. From
inspection of the respective expected wages, it is immediate that an increase in λ increases
while the increase in s decreases the equilibrium q∗. The relation between φ and q∗ will be
explored in the next section. Since, the test is informative and q∗ < 1, it is immediate that
high type holding suﬃciently high beliefs on m enrols, therefore dH = 1 is indeed the best
response.
To see that no beliefs consistent with m ∈ [0, 1) can be supported in equilibrium note
the following. ∀p>0.5EwH > EwL, while the outside option yield the same outcome for both
types, therefore it can't be that both high and low type are mixing at the same time. To
rule out m = 0, note that if µL(m) = 0 the anticipated wage of the low type taking the test
is UL(di = 1, ·) = 0 < UL(di = 0, ·) = wU(m = 0, ·) ≥ λ hence the optimal response of a low
type is dL = 0.
The equilibrium in which no-one enrols and high types hold beliefs µH(m = 0) = 1 and
µH(q = 0) < 1 while µL(m = 0) = 1 and µL(q = 0) < 1, i.e. that both types belief that
none of the high types and some of the low types apply is ruled out by the D1 reﬁnement.
To see it more clearly note that since the signalling cost is the same for everyone both types
can potentially beneﬁt from deviation if the wages oﬀered by the employers are suﬃciently
high. However, given the informativeness of the test, the set of wages making the high types
deviation proﬁtable is larger than that of the low type, therefore, upon observing a deviation
the employers assign probability 1 to the high type making the deviation proﬁtable for him.
Weaker reﬁnements (e.g. intuitive criterion) do not rule out that equilibrium.
The argument seizes to be valid for p = 0.5 and the resulting non-informativeness of the
test.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2
Proof. The logic behind the proof that m = 1 is exactly the same as in the case with
constraints. However, since now all the high types that want to take the certiﬁcation are
accepted, the expected wage of non-certiﬁed workers is 0. This decreases the value of the
outside option of the low type. As a result, the low types equilibrium application rate is
strictly higher than in the previous case. It's clear that for suﬃciently low level of private
education costs s (and suﬃciently low p) all low types apply. If the costs exceed the value
s such that UL(p(·), q = 1,m = 1, dLi = 1, s) = 0 the full application rate can not be an
equilibrium any more. Low types are better oﬀ by staying out of certiﬁcation, in which case
they receive 0 utility. However, as in the previous case, from continuity, there exists such
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q that UL(·, q, dLi = 1) = UL(·, q, dLi = 0) = 0. Only such level of low type enrolment can
be supported in equilibrium. If the payoﬀ from enrolment is higher the individually rational
decision is to enrol. The equilibrium q∗post in this case can be obtained analytically and is
given by:
q∗post = min(1,
(
−s− (−1 + p)p(1 + 2s) +√(−1 + p)2p2 + 2(1− 2p)2(−1 + p)ps+ (1− 2p)2s2)λ
2(−1 + p)ps(−1 + λ) )
Equilibrium, in which m = 0 and q = 0 is again ruled out by D1.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.3
Proof. Since the investment in certiﬁcation, from social perspective, is a pure waste, it's
immediate that the social welfare is maximised when there is no wasteful investment. For
the ﬁrst part of the proposition, I have shown that for p > 0.5 the high types always fully
enrol. To see that there exists a parameter space where high types lose on the relaxation of
constraints note the following. When the certiﬁcation is perfect (p = 1), under no constraints
all high types undertake certiﬁcation in equilibrium and their type is truly revealed, hence
UH = 1−s. When there are constraints all the high types (and none of the low types) apply,
but only δ(m = 1, q = 0) = φ/λ of them gets accepted and receives a payoﬀ 1 − s and the
rest remains uncertiﬁed receiving a strictly lower payoﬀ (λ−φ)
2
λ(1−φ) < λ < 1− s.
Now suppose the certiﬁcation is inﬁnitesimally informative. All the high types apply and
the proportion of the low types applying is such that their expected wage from applying
and staying uncertiﬁed is the same. The level of informativeness of the test implies that in
the limit lim
p→0.5+
UH = lim
p→0.5+
EwH = lim
p→0.5+
EwL = lim
p→0.5+
wU = lim
p→0.5+
UL. Since high and
low types split the available payoﬀ equally their expected wages are determined by the total
waste due to certiﬁcation costs. These costs are strictly higher when the constraints are
lifted, therefore both high and low types are better oﬀ under constraints. Since high type
utility is continuous there exists an open set of values p under which the high type is better
oﬀ under constraints.
Low types are always worse oﬀ since the relaxation of capacity constraints implies that none
of the high types remains uncertiﬁed. At the same time higher proportion of low types
undertakes the test. Since the test is informative, more information on the true types is
revealed which clearly negatively aﬀects the low types. Moreover, since m = 1, whenever
the low type's enrolment rate in post-transition regime q∗post < 1 she receives utility of 0.
The fact that welfare is maximised in the absence of signalling technology is a standard
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feature of signaling models. This result is modiﬁed if there exist supermodularities in job-
employer matching as it is shown in the next section.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.1
Proof. To see the result note that, similarly to the previous case for any value of p(·) EwH >
EwL, therefore it can't be that in equilibrium both types mix at the same time. Suppose now
that m = 1, then the exogenous capacity constraint is reached. Ωδ(Ω) = φ disregard of the
low types enrolment decisions. Therefore the subsidy c uniquely pins down the certiﬁcation
precision p. The analysis from the previous section remains valid. All the equilibria with
m = 1 from the previous scenario apply also here.
The certiﬁcation quality changes only for the total number of applications Ω < φ, which,
given that high and low types can't mix at the same time may happen only if q = 0 and
m < φ
λ
, which can not be an equilibrium.
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Chapter 3
Tuition Fees in a Signalling Model of
Education
Abstract
In many developed countries, compulsory education is provided free of charge while volun-
tary university education is oﬀered at a fee exogenously set by the authorities. This paper
analyses the eﬀect of tuition fees on educational decisions in education systems of diﬀerent
quality. I present a model of interactions between privately informed students of two types
and competitive employers that play a noisy signalling game when university enrolment is
costly. I show the eﬀect of education quality on educational expenditure, enrolment decisions
and educational eﬀort exerted. I highlight the degree of substitutability between tuition fees
and the non-pecuniary costs of educational eﬀort under asymmetry of information. In the
analysed game, individuals invest in education to signal their innate abilities to future em-
ployers. They decide whether to enrol in a university and choose what educational eﬀort
to exert. Universities truthfully reveal to the employers the educational eﬀort they observe
imperfectly. Tuition fees can partially substitute educational eﬀort in revealing information
about the type, reducing the necessary eﬀort level. Furthermore they can restore a separat-
ing equilibrium which, in the absence of fees, ceases to exist for high levels of noise. The
impact of tuition fees is, however, complex as it can both increase and decrease the equilib-
rium eﬀort level depending on parameters.
Keywords: Signalling games, Noise, Tuition Fees
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D82, C72, H42 , I23
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3.1 Introduction
There is a general agreement in the economic literature that is is diﬃcult to overstate the
importance of education quality for economic development. Hanushek (2011) claims that
just replacing the bottom 5-8 percent of teachers with average teachers in American schools
could bring a present value of $100 trillion increase in additional long term productivity. The
potential social gains from understanding the role of quality should be motivating enough
to pursue research in this area. Given that importance, education quality, together with
university tuition fees and enrolment rates, have always been in the centre of public debate
around the world. Despite the importance of education systems, the channels through which
tuition fees aﬀect education quality and student's incentives to enrol in university education
are not well understood in the literature. McDuﬀ (2007), a notable empirical exception,
shows that an increase in both tuition fees and quality at American in-state public colleges
and universities increases demand among good students but decreases demand among bad
students. More precisely, an increase in both quality1 and tuition increases demand among
applicants with high scores in pre-entry exams but decreases demand among low achievers,
resulting in a negative net change in the number of applications.
In this paper I will present a mechanism that can rationalise this result. In a framework
in which education is purely a signalling device, with no human capital eﬀect, I analyse
the relation between educational quality and tuition fees. When signals are imprecise, the
monetary cost of obtaining a degree (money burning) may supplement the educational eﬀort
in revelation of innate abilities. Bad students, given the fee, ﬁnd it more costly to obtain
a degree than the good ones. Therefore, the tuition fee that discourages students from
entering the educational system aﬀects mostly the enrolment rate of bad students. As a
result, as the fee increases, the employers face a higher proportion of good students in a
pool of university graduates. This allows the employers to decrease their requirements for
prospective candidates for high skill jobs necessary to select a skilled job applicant. If the
level of noise is high, the utility gain from a decrease in the required educational eﬀort
may compensate the monetary cost of education. Consequently, good students want to pay
tuition fees exceeding the marginal cost of education provision. Tuition fees are a better
substitute for educational eﬀort in deterring the low types from enrolment when the level of
noise is moderate than when the signal is precise. When the signal is precise the fees need
to be very high for the described mechanism to work.
1The author designed a quality index based on mean SAT scores of the entering freshman class, freshman
retention rate, and spending per student.
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The key mechanism behind those results is the assumption of information asymmetry
which is mitigated through a signalling technology (education). The signal is received with
noise and the level of noise will be referred to as the quality of education. Noise, a common
problem in education systems, may be caused by a number of factors. School curricula often
test diﬀerent qualiﬁcations than those required by the employers, the grading system is often
coarse by design, the exam grades reﬂect not only knowledge in a given ﬁeld but also the
propensity to cheat. The list here is by no means complete, but it highlights the importance
of including noise in a model of education signalling.
Since the seminal work of Spence (1973), signalling models have received a lot of attention
in economics and other sciences. In particular, the addition of noise to the original model
have been widely used in educational settings. Applied work in the ﬁeld follows closely
theoretical results obtained by Matthews and Mirman (1983) and Carlsson and Dasgupta
(1997). Their developments assure uniqueness of separating equilibria and allow for smooth,
and hence more interesting comparative statics with respect to prior beliefs and other model
parameters. The modelling framework developed there is the basis for this paper. Drawing
from the described work, Landeras and De Villarreal (2005) analysed the eﬀects of noise on
education expenditure. They show that noise in the education credential system may lead to
an over investment in education. They show that, when the transmitted signal is not clear,
agents put more eﬀort in communicating their true type. However, those authors consider
signalling technologies with only one type of cost satisfying a single crossing condition. In
this paper, in addition to the eﬀort with diﬀerent marginal costs across types, I add pecuniary
costs, which are the same for both student types.
An important complement to signalling is the literature on certiﬁcation. In the certiﬁca-
tion setting, the separation between types takes place via an eﬀortless certiﬁcation technology
(though pecuniary costs are possible) that oﬀers diﬀerent probabilities of a passing grade
to diﬀerent types. This paper draws from the contributions of De and Nabar (1991) who
analyse the impact of the quality of a signalling device (a binary test) on the demand for
certiﬁcation and the utility of players. The authors show that the lower the certiﬁcation
precision, for a given price, the higher the incentives for the seller of the low quality good
to attempt to obtain a certiﬁcate of quality. An increased number of applications of the low
types decreases the informativeness of the certiﬁcate, which decreases the utility of the high
quality sellers. In a noisy signalling setting employment probabilities, in equilibrium, diﬀer
between the types akin to a pure certiﬁcation model. When the noise level is high tuition
fees can substitute for certiﬁcation precision by deterring low type from taking the test.
The combination of signalling and grades, i.e. a situation in which single crossing condi-
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tion holds for two (possibly) independent dimensions, has been analysed in detail by Daley
and Green (forthcoming). Their approach, although very rich and inspiring, is not necessar-
ily the most suitable when applied to the European education systems. In many European
countries tuition fees are set often set by authorities to a not too high level. Consequently,
the range of scholarships attracting the most able students is limited making the ﬁnancial
dimension of enrolment not too sensitive to student abilities . Therefore, in this paper, I
analyse a model with two types of signals but with single crossing condition holding only in
one of the dimensions.
Educational eﬀort, which leads to human and social capital accumulation, that is not
fully observed and adequately rewarded on the job market, rather that treated as a waste
can be a policymaker's objective. Taking this perspective, Dubey and Geanakoplos (2010)
show that in order to maximise the eﬀort level there should be a non-zero level of noise in
the grading system. However, those authors don't analyse the eﬀect of the pecuniary costs
of education and the resulting self-selection eﬀect. I show that the eﬀect of tuition fees on
equilibrium signalling eﬀort is non monotonic. An increase in the pecuniary costs can lead
to either an increase or a decrease in aggregate educational eﬀort depending on parameter
values.
The recent experimental work by de Haan et al. (2011) and Jeitschko and Normann
(2012) demonstrate the empirical relevance of the predictions of noisy signalling games.
Their laboratory experiments show that agents actions diﬀer between the deterministic and
the stochastic environment. As predicted by the theory, there is more signalling behaviour
when the signals are noisy.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the basic modelling assump-
tion and characterises the players and their objectives. In Section 3.3 I deﬁne the equilibrium
concept in a benchmark model without tuition fees to demonstrate the key relations between
senders and receivers. In Section 3.4, the eﬀects of introducing tuition fees for participation
in education are presented. In Section 3.5, conduct a welfare analysis of the economy in order
to to make a statement on the optimality of tuition fees. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Model
I study interactions between senders (students), receivers (employers) and tuition fees charged
by non-strategic third party signalling institutions (universities) that play a noisy signalling
game in an economy with asymmetric information. Details about players and their prefer-
ences are presented below.
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3.2.1 Students
The population of students is, for simplicity, represented by a single, risk neutral, privately
informed representative agent (she). With probability λ ∈ [0, 1] she is of high type and has
learning abilities θH . With probability 1 − λ she is of low type and exhibits abilities θL
where θH > θL. W.l.o.g. I normalise θL = 1. The variables characterising the two types are
presented with respective subscripts H and L
Before entering the labour market, the agent makes a binary decision whether to register
at a university, denoted by di ∈ [0, 1], where 0 means never register, 1 is always register
and in-between values represent mixed strategies. If the agent registers, she pays a type
independent tuition fee f and at an additional non-pecuniary cost c(ei, θi) =
ei
θi
chooses
educational attainment ei ∈ R+. The sole purpose of education is signalling, it does not
aﬀect productivity. Upon leaving the university the student enters the labour market, where
she receives a wage oﬀer conditional on her academic record. I assume there are no costs
other than tuition fees incurred by the student while at university,2. Utility of a worker that
has decided to pay a tuition fee receiving wage w is given by:
Ui = E(wi|ei, σi)− di ∗
(
f +
ei
θi
)
(3.2.1)
Relation between the expected wage, individual eﬀort is explained later in the paper. If a
student receives more than one identical job oﬀers she chooses one at random.
3.2.2 University
I assume a single, non strategic university (signalling technology) that observes imperfect
measures of student's educational attainment and issues credentials, which are truthfully
revealed to employers. Credentials are the only available source of information on abilities
of prospective workers. I assume the credentials zi to be a sum of the student's educational
eﬀort e and a random variable σ ∗ εi, where εi is drawn from a diﬀerentiable distribution
G(ε) that is symmetric and has zero mean. σ is a scaling factor that can be understood
as a measure of quality of universities. The lower σ, the higher the quality. Henceforth I
will refer to σ as the level of noise. The level of noise is taken as given by the university.
Formally, I write z as:
zi = ei + σ ∗ εi (3.2.2)
2 One can think of some other interpretations of this assumption e.g. that human capital returns to
education compensate the opportunity cost.
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I also assume that the conditional density of z given e (z|e) weakly (strongly on a non
empty support) satisﬁes the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP). Intuitively, this
implies that higher levels of true educational attainment e obtained by a student become
more likely as the observed signal z increases.3 In the remaining part, I assume ε to have a
triangular distribution g(ε) with a support on [−1, 1]. The distribution has been chosen for
algebraic convenience.
The cost of education provision (certiﬁcation) is assumed to be equal 0. In the next
section in a benchmark model I assume that university charges no tuition fees, while in the
subsequent sections the fee is set to an exogenous level f .
3.2.3 Employers
I assume two types of jobs, a high skill and a low skill jobs. In a perfectly competitive market
for low skill jobs, labour productivity and hence the wage for both types is the same and
w.l.o.g. normalised to 0.
In the high skill job market, two employers compete in recruitment strategies (require-
ments) to select a high type to ﬁll the vacancy. All workers employed in this sector are paid
an exogenously set wage w > 0.4 However, the productivity of high skill jobs is aﬀected by
the worker's type. The total surplus generated by matching a high skill job with a high type
is x where x > w, so the employer's surplus is x− w. A low type matched with a high skill
job generates no surplus, so the cost for the employer is −w.
Since the receiver does not observe directly the sender's eﬀort, she has to use statistical
inference in order to update her beliefs about the action taken, and thus learn the agent's
type. The employer decides to hire if the expected proﬁt given the signal (and posterior belief
about the type) of ﬁlling the vacancy is non negative. The expected proﬁt from employing
a student sending a signal z, under Bayesian learning and high type educational strategies
µH(e) and low types' strategy µL(e), is given by:
VE(z|µH , µL) = −w + β(z) ∗ x (3.2.3)
3These assumptions facilitate the equilibrium analysis, because they imply that the employer uses a cut-oﬀ
strategy in any non-pooling equilibrium (cf. de Haan et al. (2011)).
4Predeﬁned wage bands are common in many countries in publicly ﬁnanced positions. Moreover, the
model applies to entry-level positions, where the wage diﬀerentiation is rather limited.
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where :
β(z) =
λ ∗ ´ g( z−e
σ
) ∗ µH(e)de
λ ∗ ´ g( z−e
σ
) ∗ µH(e)de+ (1− λ) ∗
´
g( z−e
σ
) ∗ µL(e)de (3.2.4)
β(z) is the employers' posterior belief that the student is of the high type upon observing
credentials z and given that the students use strategies µH(e) for high and µL(e) for low
type respectively. More precisely, µH(e) (µL(e)) denote the probability with which the high
(low) type chooses signal costs e in equilibrium.
3.2.4 Timing
First nature assigns the student type and the level of noise. Subsequently, tuition fees are
exogenously set (to zero in the next section). Employers commit to a rule determining which
workers to employ (given the exogenous wage w). Knowing the employers' strategies the
agent chooses whether to enrol a university and if she decides to do so she chooses her
educational attainment. In the next stage, the education system causes noisy distortions ε
to the education outcomes and payoﬀs are realised. Graphically the timeline is presented in
Figure 3.1.
Nature assigns θi and σ
Decision maker sets f
Employment rule is set
Education decisions
Payoﬀs
Figure 3.1: Timeline
3.2.5 Equilibrium Concept
I employ a perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept to solve the game, such that the following
sequence of actions hold. Employers commit to a mapping from their beliefs on student's
signal to employment decision. The representative student maps from employers' strategies
to education decisions. Belief-strategy combination satisﬁes Bayes' rule whenever possible,
and sequential rationality always.
In this type of games a pooling equilibrium in which both student types choose e = 0
always exists. In this trivial equilibrium employers never (always) hire when λ < (>)w
x
.
Throughout, the paper I will focus only on non trivial equilibria and limit the analysis to
parameter range in which those equilibria exist.
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Deﬁnition 3.2.1. A non trivial equilibrium is an equilibrium in which employers' strategy
changes with the signal observed.
3.3 Free Education
To give a better understanding of the key elements of the model and to give intuition about
the players' strategies I will ﬁrst present a standard noisy signalling model with no pecuniary
costs of education. Later, I analyse the eﬀect of tuition fees on equilibrium outcomes.
Assumption 1. f = 0. The university charges no tuition fee.
To rule out trivial equilibria in which everyone is employed irrespective of the educational
expenditure and eﬀort I make the following assumption:
Assumption 2. If σ < w, λ <
w(2w2−σ2)θ2H
2w2xθ2H−σ2(x+w(θ2H−1))
, otherwise λ < w
x
Assumption 2 allows to focus only on non trivial equilibria with employment. More
detailed interpretation is presented later in the text. The assumption excludes the area
above the solid line.
I solve the game in the order suggested by backward induction.
Lemma 3.3.1. The employers' best response rule in a non trivial equilibrium is of the
following form:
pi(z) = 0 if z < z∗
pi(z) = 1 if z > z∗
where pi(z) is the employment probability after observing signal z.
Due to MLRP property β(z) is increasing in z. Since g(ε) is continuous, there exists a
threshold level z∗ such that the expected proﬁts from having the vacancy ﬁlled are equal to
zero, and above which positive proﬁts are observed. For a formal proof see Carlsson and
Dasgupta (1997) or the appendix of de Haan et al. (2011). As a result the employer's proﬁt
is given by:
UE =
ˆ ∞
z∗
VE(z) dz.
For further analysis it is useful to deﬁne the expected wage as a function of choice variables
and parameters
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Deﬁnition 3.3.1. Expected wage:
E(wi|·)|ei, σi) = w ∗
(
1−G
(
z∗(·)− ei(σi)
σ
))
A student's payoﬀ is equal to the expected wage (the exogenous wage multiplied by
the probability of sending the signal higher than the threshold conditional on educational
attainment) net of the cost of the signal sent. Therefore we can rewrite Equation 3.2.1 in
the following way:
Ui(ei, ·) = max
ei≥0
w ∗
(
1−G
(
z∗ − ei
σ
))
− ei
θi
(3.3.1)
Where z∗ is the threshold level set by the receiver.
Lemma 3.3.2. The optimal level of eﬀort for a type i for given threshold and noise level
takes the following values:
e∗i =

ei = σ + z
∗ − σ2wθi if z∗ < σ
2
2wθi
+ wθi − σ ∧ 0 < σ ≤
(
2−√2)wθi
or z∗ < (1+
√
2)σ(wθi−σ)
wθi
∧ (2−√2)wθi < σ < wθi
ei = 0 otherwise
(3.3.2)
The result comes from maximising Equation 3.3.1 with respect to the eﬀort level for each
of the types. I will call ei low eﬀort level and ei high level of eﬀort of the type i with a caveat
that the low eﬀort level is the same, i.e. zero, for both types, while the high eﬀort level is
higher for the high type. Zero eﬀort makes the model similar to a pure certiﬁcation model, in
which the probability of receiving the certiﬁcate is determined by the employers' threshold.
The condition above shows that if the level of noise σ and the employer's threshold z∗ are
not too high, both student types want to exert high eﬀort ei. However, the understanding
of what "not too high" is diﬀers between the types. High types continue exerting high eﬀort
for higher levels of employer's threshold and higher levels of noise than the low types. The
optimal eﬀort condition implies that there exists such a threshold z∗ that a high type ﬁnds
it optimally to exert eH while the low type chooses eL. In particular, when σ > w low type
is exerting no eﬀort disregard of the threshold. When σ or z∗ are too high, good students
ﬁnd it too costly to diﬀerentiate and both types choose no eﬀort at all.
To characterise the equilibria it is useful to deﬁne the following critical values of σ. The
interpretation is presented in the description of the subsequent proposition.
Deﬁnition 3.3.2.
Given the types' optimal responses we can identify the following equilibria of the game.
76 Chapter3
σ1 =
(
2−√2)w σ2 = √2(1−λ)w2θH(1+√2)(1−λ)wθH−λ(x−w)
σ3 =
w2θH(1−λ)(
√
2xλ+w(2−
√
2−2λ))
2wxλ−x2λ2+w2(1−4λ+2λ2)
Proposition 3.3.1. There exist the following non trivial equilibria in which the high type
uses pure strategies:
1. If σ ≤ σ1 there exists a unique non trivial equilibrium in which the employers set the
threshold to z∗ = w − σ + σ2
2w
, high type always chooses eﬀort level eH = eH and the
low type mixes between exerting eﬀort eL = eL and eﬀort eL = 0.
2. If σ1 ≤ σ < σ2 there exists a unique non trivial equilibrium in which the employers set
the threshold to z∗ = (
1+
√
2)(w−σ)σ
w
, high type always chooses eﬀort level eH = eH and
the low type mixes between exerting eﬀort eL = eL and eﬀort eL = 0
3. If σ2 < σ < σ3 there exists a non trivial pure strategy equilibrium in which the employers
set the threshold to z∗ = σ − σ2λ(x−w)
(1−λ)w2θH , high type always chooses eﬀort level eH = eH
and the low type always chooses eL = 0.
4. If σ > σ3 non trivial equilibrium does not exist.
There exists also an equilibrium in which the high type mixes between eH = eH and eH = 0
while the low type always chooses eL = 0.
For the formal proof see the Appendix. Informally, the employers move ﬁrst and in the
equilibrium they are aware of the sender's incentives to manipulate the ﬂow of information.
That is, they are aware that the high type will choose an action in hopes of distinguishing
herself from the low type and, similarly, that the low type will attempt to mimic the high
type. It can be shown that, given the Assumption 2, when both types always choose ei no
equilibrium exist, therefore the equilibrium threshold (or the noise level) has to be suﬃciently
high to deter the low type from exerting high eﬀort. At the same time the equilibrium
threshold has to be high enough to assure that the employers do not make losses. When
σ is low, (σ < σ2) the equilibrium threshold level is driven by the deterrence reasoning.
In equilibrium, the threshold is set to a level that the low type is indiﬀerent between the
two eﬀort levels and mixes in a way that the employers receive zero expected proﬁt on the
marginal employer. When σ = σ1, z
∗ = σ and hence for 0 < σ ≤ σ1 the low type's utility
is zero. When σ > σ1 , z
∗ < σ and hence even zero eﬀort gives chances for employment.
When σ1 ≤ σ < σ2 low type's probability of choosing eL decreases with σ until it reaches 0
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for σ = σ2. For σ2 < σ < σ3 in a non trivial equilibrium employers set the threshold to a
level that assures zero expected proﬁt on the marginal employer, given that the high type
always exerts high eﬀort and the low type always exerts low eﬀort. When σ = σ3 high type
is indiﬀerent between exerting high and low eﬀort. For higher values of σ (area under the
dashed line in the bottom right corner in Figure 3.2), signalling becomes too costly also for
the high type and no separating equilibrium exists. I will refer to the equilibrium threshold
level for 0<σ < σ2 as "prohibitive" threshold as it makes the high eﬀort level prohibitively
expensive for the low type. Interestingly this "prohibitive" strategy is independent of the
proportion of high types in population.
The area of existence of non-trivial equilibria in σ - λ space is presented graphically in
Figure 3.2. The equilibrium space is restricted from above by Assumption 2 and from below
by incentive compatibility constraint of the high type.
Figure 3.2: Range of existence of separating equilibrium
Other parameter values: θH = 2, x = 200, w = 100, λ = 0.2
Figure 3.3 presents educational eﬀort of the high type eH , the low type eﬀort (eL and
eL) and the optimal threshold level z
∗. The ﬁgure clearly shows that equilibrium threshold
consists of two parts. The decreasing part in range σ < σ2 makes the low type choose no
educational eﬀort. The increasing part for σ2 < σ < σ3 sets the employers' expected proﬁt
from employing the marginal student to 0 (given that eH = eH and eL = eL). For high
values of σ, signalling becomes too costly for the high type and the equilibrium collapses. As
will be shown in the next section, the separating equilibrium in this range can be restored
with tuition fees. Before moving to the next section presenting the eﬀects of introduction of
tuition fees on equilibrium characteristics, it is useful to make a couple of observations.
Observation 3.3.1. For low levels of σ, in all of the non-trivial equilibria the threshold level
z∗ and optimal educational attainment eH are independent of λ. For high values of σ, z∗ and
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Figure 3.3: Optimal Threshold and Signal
Other parameter values: θH = 2, x = 200, w = 100, λ = 0.2. The dashed line marks σ2 beyond
which pure strategy equilibrium exists.
eH are decreasing in λ.
Observation 3.3.2. For σ ≤ σ1 the low type receives zero utility. For larger σ, her expected
pay-oﬀ increases in σ.
Both observations follow directly from the functional forms of z∗ and eH .
3.4 Tuition fees
In this section I drop the assumption that the university charges no tuition fee (Assump-
tion 1). Without the tuition fees, the agents had no reasons not to enrol. With the introduc-
tion of a pecuniary cost, it is necessary to extend the decision space to two dimensions (di, ei).
The proportion of high types at university changes from λ to λˆ(dH , dL) =
dH∗λ
dH∗λ+(1−λ)∗dL .
For an agent to register at a university, the tuition fee cannot exceed the expected beneﬁt
from education. If an agent chooses di = 0, she does not participate in the second stage of
the signalling game in which she would choose her eﬀort.
Given the multiplicity of the employers threshold-setting strategies in Proposition 3.3.1,
the speciﬁcation of all equilibria with tuition fees is tedious. To facilitate the analysis it is
useful to deﬁne the following levels of tuition fees.
Deﬁnition 3.4.1.
fA =
(x−w)2λ2σ2
2w3θ2H(1−λ)2
fC = w − σ22w
fB = w −
(
2 +
√
2
)
σ +
(3+2
√
2)σ2
2w
fD = w − σ22wθ2H
fE =
2w2θ2H−2(2+
√
2)wθHσ+(3+2
√
2)σ2
2wθ2H
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Proposition 3.4.1. There exist the following non trivial equilibria in which the high type
always enrols and exerts high eﬀort:
1. If σ ≤ σ1 and f < fC or σ1 < σ < w and fB < f < fC there exists a unique non
trivial equilibrium in which the employers set the threshold that is decreasing in f and
the low type mixes between enrolment and no education. The low type, if enrols, exerts
high eﬀort. For fC < f < fD, low type's enrolment rate is decreasing in f , those who
enrol exert zero eﬀort.
2. If σ1 < σ < σ2 and the fee is suﬃciently low (f < fB), there exists a unique non trivial
equilibrium in which the employers threshold does not change with f , low type always
enrols and mixes between exerting high and low eﬀort.
3. If σ2 < σ < σ3 and f < fA low type always enrols and exerts low eﬀort and the
employers threshold does not change with f .
4. If σ2 < σ < w and fA < f < fB or when w < σ < σ3 and fA < f < fD or when
σ3 < σ < θH ∗ w and fE < f < fD low type mixes between enrolment with low eﬀort
and staying out of education. Equilibrium enrolment rate and employer's threshold are
decreasing in f .
There exist also non trivial equilibria in which the high type mixes between enrolment with
high eﬀort and enrolment with low eﬀort while the low type enrols and exerts low eﬀort.
Furthermore, there exists also a continuum of trivial equilibria with and without employment.
The proposition describes all equilibria with high type's full enrolment, for full character-
isation and the proof see the Appendix. Intuitively, the agent enrols whenever the expected
wage is higher than the tuition fee. Therefore, when the fee is lower than the low type's
payoﬀ in equilibrium without tuition fees (see Proposition 3.3.1), the fees don't aﬀect the
equilibrium strategies as in 2. and 3..5 Compared to equilibrium with no tuition fees the
only diﬀerence is that the rents are captured by the universities.
In other cases tuition fees aﬀect the equilibrium strategies. In 1. the introduction of
tuition fees results in a decrease of the equilibrium threshold. The decrease is necessary
to make the low type indiﬀerent between enrolment with high eﬀort and staying out of
education. No one can enrol and exert no eﬀort as this strategy would assure negative
5When σ1 < σ < σ2 and f < fB , i.e. when the fee is lower than the expected wage of a student exerting
no eﬀort under the "prohibitive" threshold or when σ2 < σ < σ3 and f < fA, i.e. when the fee is lower than
the expected wage for an agent exerting zero eﬀort given the equilibrium threshold level.
80 Chapter3
pay-oﬀ unless the threshold is suﬃciently low, which happens for f > fC . For f = fC ,
eL = eL = 0.
Observation 3.4.1. As long as the high type always enrols, a fee is set to f ∈ (fA, fD),
when σ > w, to f ∈ (fA, fB) when σ2 < σ < w, or f ∈ (fC , fD) when σ < w low type's
equilibrium enrolment decision dL is a one to one mapping from tuition fees.
Finally, when σ2 < σ < θH ∗w and f > fA the fees exceed the low types pay-oﬀ with no
tuition fees and low type's incentive compatibility condition is slack. Even if the threshold
is decreased, the low types continue exerting low eﬀort. There is a degree of substitutability
between educational eﬀort and tuition fees. Costly education works as a partially reveal-
ing self-selection mechanism. When the tuition fees are high, low type enrols with lower
probability, hence the employers are more conﬁdent about the quality of the students, which
allows them to reduce the threshold (to a level not lower than the "prohibitive" threshold).
For the equilibrium to exist the fee can not exceed fD, a level above which the high type's
best response is negative eﬀort, ruled out by assumption. The same mechanism is observed
for fC < f < fD when or σ < w.
Observation 3.4.2. When tuition fee is suﬃciently high (f ∈ (fE, fD)) a separating equi-
librium in the range in which without tuition fees eﬀort is prohibitively expensive for the high
type (σ > σ3) is restored.
Without tuition fees there exists a level of noise above which signalling becomes pro-
hibitively expensive even for the high type and separating equilibrium does not exist. This
can change with suﬃciently high tuition fees. As shown before, over a certain range of param-
eters, conditional on high type's enrolment, tuition fees deter the low type from education.
This results in a decrease in employer requirements necessary to assure a non negative proﬁt
on the marginal employee. In that range a decrease in eﬀort costs for the high type exceeds
the resulting increase in tuition fees. Therefore, when tuition fees are high enough, the
threshold decreases to a level that makes separation proﬁtable for the high type. The area
in which suﬃciently high tuition fees can restore separating equilibrium is marked as Area
4 in Figure 3.4.
3.5 Welfare Analysis
The welfare implications of tuition fees, given the multiplicity of equilibrium types is far
from being obvious. This section shows that players in this game have diﬀerent preferences
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with respect to tuition fees. High types is best oﬀ when the tuition fees are zero for low
levels of noise while for high levels of noise he prefers positive fees. Employers' preferences
are the opposite, their proﬁts are maximised for high fees when the noise level is low and
for high fees when the signal is precise. The results are formally established in the following
propositions.
Proposition 3.5.1. From high type's perspective the optimal tuition fees are equal
f ∗ =

0 if λ > w
2x−w or σ <
2w3/2θH(1−λ)√
w((2+
√
2)θH−
√
2)(1−λ)+
√
2−2λ√w+wλ−2xλ
fB if
2w3/2θH(1−λ)√
w((2+
√
2)θH−
√
2)(1−λ)+
√
2−2λ√w+wλ−2xλ < σ <
√
2wθH
θH+
√
2θH−1
σ2
2wθ2H
if λ < w
2x−w and σ >
√
2wθH
θH+
√
2θH−1
(3.5.1)
For the proof, see the Appendix. Intuitively, as stressed in Observation 3.4.1, there exists
a range of parameters in which tuition fees deter low types from enrolment, which allows
the employers to reduce the threshold. In that range, in an equilibrium with f ∈ (fA, σ22wθ2H )
savings on educational eﬀort cost caused by marginal increase in tuition fees exceed the
pecuniary cost increment. In equilibrium with f < fA tuition fees don't aﬀect the equilibrium
strategies, therefore the positive eﬀect of tuition fees has to be suﬃciently strong to outweigh
the losses accruing for low values of f . The threshold is suﬃciently sensitive to changes in
fees only when the proportion of high types in the pool of students is low.
The ranges of diﬀerent values of optimal fee are presented graphically in Figure 3.4.
Without the tuition fees, employment equilibrium does not exist in Area 4 as the eﬀort
cost is prohibitively expensive. Suﬃciently high tuition fees allow for a decrease of the low
type enrolment and hence a decrease in the threshold to a level that does not breach the
high type's incentive compatibility constraint. High type's utility, in this range, is maximised
when f = σ
2
2wθ2H
. The same fee is optimal also in Area 3, though in that range an employment
equilibrium exists also without tuition fees. This area is bounded from above by λ = w
2x−w .
For higher values of λ the reduction of threshold in response to an increase in tuition fee is
too small and the high types are best oﬀ without tuition fees. In Area 2, that corresponds
to the second row of Equation 3.5.1, the optimal tuition fee is fB. This level of fees reduces
the threshold to a level for which the low type is indiﬀerent between exerting high and low
eﬀort. In Area 1, i.e. for low levels of σ or high values of λ the high type is best oﬀ when
the fees are set to 0.
Proposition 3.5.2. For all values of σ, social welfare is the highest in an equilibrium with
tuition fees set to f = fD, the highest level allowing for an employment equilibrium. For
σ > σ2 employers' proﬁts are the highest when tuition fees are set the lowest level for which an
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Figure 3.4: Range of existence of separating equilibrium with tuition fees
Other parameter values: θH = 2, x = 200, w = 100, λ = 0.2
employment equilibrium exist. For lower levels of noise the proﬁts are maximised at f = fD.
Both functions are non-monotonic in tuition fees. Low types never beneﬁt from tuition fees.
For the proof, see the Appendix. Intuitively, the only determinants of social welfare are
high type's employment probability and total educational eﬀort exerted by the students.
Tuition fees and wages are merely transfers and aﬀect the pay-oﬀs only through their impact
on equilibrium strategies. High type's employment probability, in employment equilibria, is
independent of the threshold level, as long as the threshold is not too high and his incentive
compatibility constraint is not breached. This component of total welfare depends only on
noise level. The other component, eﬀort, changes with the employer's threshold, which, in
equilibrium, changes with tuition fees. When the fees are set to the highest level allowing
employment equilibrium (f = fD) employer's threshold reaches its minimum and hence the
additive eﬀort also reaches its minimum.
In equilibrium in which the low type student exerts high eﬀort, the lower the low type's
enrolment rate the higher the employer's pay-oﬀ. When low typs exerts low eﬀort, the higher
the threshold the higher the pay-oﬀ. Employer's proﬁt in equilibria in which the low type
exerts low eﬀort is strictly higher than in equilibria in which low type exerts high eﬀort.
For low level of noise this equilibrium type is reached only for high fees, while for higher
levels this type of equilibrium exists with both high and low fees. Although the enrolment
decreases in fees, the threshold decreases even faster, which makes employers best oﬀ with
zero fees.
High type's utility, social welfare and employer's proﬁt are presented graphically in Fig-
ure 3.5. The observed discontinuity in employer's proﬁt on the left panel is caused by a
change of equilibrium types. To the left of the jump, all low types that register exert high
eﬀort. As a result the median of the low type eﬀort distribution is higher than the employer's
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threshold. Increase of tuition fees above fC makes low type exert zero eﬀort. As a result the
median of the low type's signal distribution is lower than the threshold, which, given that
the equilibrium enrolment rate is not higher than in the former case makes the employers
proﬁts grow. The right panel shows that when the noise level is high, for the non trivial
equilibrium to exist the tuition fees can not be too low or too high.
Figure 3.5: Social Welfare, High type's utility and employer's proﬁt for diﬀerent levels of
tuition feel
Even though I have shown that for high values of noise the social welfare increases in f ,
one has to keep in mind that the surplus is now captured by the universities. The low types
are worse oﬀ compared to the scenario in which certiﬁcation was free, whereas the high types
may beneﬁt from introduction of fees.
3.6 Conclusions
This paper focuses on the eﬀect of noisy signalling and tuition fees on students' education
investment decisions and the subsequent employment probabilities. The paper contributes
to the economic literature by characterising equilibria in a noisy signalling model in which
signalling is divided into two stages. In the ﬁrst stage stage (costly enrolment), students
decide to enrol in a university at a fee. This signalling technology does not satisfy the single
crossing condition, but the signal is perfectly observed by the employers. In the second stage,
the enrolled students exert education eﬀort. In this signalling technology, the high type has
a cost advantage over the low type, but the signal is observed by the employers with noise.
Compared to the standard noisy signalling model, an additional signalling device, even if it
does not satisfy the single crossing condition, can support the educational eﬀort in revealing
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the information about the true type to the employers when the eﬀort is observed by the
employers with noise.
The paper describes in details the complex, nonmonotonic relationship between the tu-
ition fees and students' and employers' strategies. Depending on the parameters, an increase
in tuition fees can lead to either an increase or a decrease in high types' and employers'
payoﬀs and students' educational eﬀort. Therefore, the higher education authorities need
to be very careful when setting the tuition fees in an attempt to select the most favourable
equilibrium for policy objectives.
For example Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010) show in a model without tuition fees that if
universities' main objective is reputation deﬁned as graduates' employment probability, the
certiﬁcation institutions may have incentives to reveal less than they actually know. I show
that tuition fees can be also used as a tool that serves this purpose as they may increase
incentives of the low types to exert eﬀort or reduce employer's requirements. For the same
reason, tuition fees could be used by the authorities if, as in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2010),
one of the universities' objectives is the maximisation of educational eﬀort.
As disturbing can be considered the fact that for a wide range of university quality levels
high type's welfare is maximised when the certiﬁcation institutions collect a signiﬁcant part
of surplus despite no cost incurred in the certiﬁcation process. However, this happens only
when the signal quality is very low which, hopefully, is a purely theoretical result. The
results of the model apply only when agents are perfectly informed about their types, face
no budget constraints and are risk neutral. In reality students learn their types also during
the education process and diﬀer in risk aversion and in initial endowments. As a result, one
could expect the propensity to invest in education to be related not only to price and quality
of education but also to self conﬁdence and wealth.
The paper can be extended in a number of directions. First of all, in the model I
abstract from human capital formation. Introduction of additional beneﬁts would alter the
welfare calculations, though the key result would qualitatively remain undistorted. Another
possibility is to connect the model closer to Daley and Green (forthcoming) and to analyse
the eﬀects of scholarships for the best students. This scenario would be even more interesting
when uncertainty about the types is introduced also on the students' side. In this scenario,
the students would learn their type fully only at the university i.e. after the decision to pay
tuition fees is taken.
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Appendix - Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.3.1
Given the students' optimal response function (see Equation 3.3.2) we have 4 pairs of high
and low type strategies that could possibly form a pure strategy equilibrium. They are
given by {eH , eL}, {eH , eL}, {eH , eL}, {eH , eL} where the expressions in brackets represent
the optimal educational attainment of the high and the low type respectively. To ﬁnd the
equilibria (or more speciﬁcally to show that 3 of the 4 couplets can not form a pure strategy
equilibrium) I ﬁrst assume that they are equilibrium strategies and attempt to ﬁnd the best
response of the employers, which move ﬁrst. If the triple forms a set of mutual best response
it is an equilibrium.
Firstly, I show that the pair {eH , eL} cannot be a pure strategy equilibrium. Suppose
that the students choose {eH , eL} with probability 1. The posterior belief that an agent
sending signal equal to the threshold z is of high type β(z) simpliﬁes to:
β(z) =
λ ∗ φ( σ
wθH
− 1)
λ ∗ φ( σ
wθH
− 1) + (1− λ) ∗ φ( σ
wθL
− 1)
Since the high eﬀort level function is additive, the posterior belief does not depend on
threshold z∗, the terms cancel out (however it does depend on σ). Any threshold satisfying
low type's could be an equilibrium if the employer's expected proﬁt given in the equation
below is non negative.
V Ei (z = 0, eH , eL) = λ ∗ (x− w) ∗
(
1−G
(
0− eH
σ
))
− (1− λ) ∗ (w) ∗
(
1−G
(
0− eL
σ
))
This happens only if λ >
w(2w2−σ2)θ2H
2w2xθ2H−σ2(x+w(θ2H−1))
which is ruled out by Assumption 2 . There-
fore the triple {z = 0, eH , eL} can not be a pure strategy equilibrium.
Another candidate is deﬁned by the pair of students strategies {eH , eL}. If that is the
equilibrium strategy, the probability that an agent sending a signal equal to threshold z is
of a high type is given by
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β(z) =
λ ∗ φ( σ
wθH
− 1)
λ ∗ φ( σ
wθH
− 1) + (1− λ) ∗ φ( z
σ
)
Now, the posterior beliefs (weakly) monotonically change with the observed signal. This
condition is suﬃcient for the existence of a cut-oﬀ strategy (see Carlsson and Dasgupta
(1997) for a formal proof). The existence of a threshold strategy of the employer is a
necessary condition for the equilibrium.
When the types play {eH , eL} the threshold solving
max
z≥0
ˆ +∞
z
−w + β(z) ∗ x dz
is given by
z∗ = σ − σ
2λ(x− w)
(1− λ)w2θH (3.6.1)
For this threshold to be the equilibrium eH and eL need to be the best responses. It is the
case for σ ∈ (σ2, σ3). For lower values of σ the low type prefers eL. For higher values of
noise, eﬀort eH becomes prohibitively expensive for the high type.
The proof that {eH , eL} can not be an equilibrium couplet of senders strategies follows
similar logic. The posterior belief given by:
β(z) =
λ ∗ φ( z
σ
)
λ ∗ φ( z
σ
) + (1− λ) ∗ φ( σ
w
− 1)
is decreasing in the observed signal, therefore it can not be an equilibrium.
Finally, if the student chooses {eH = 0, eL = 0}, the employment decision depends only
the proportion of the high types in the population. The employers employ if λ ≥ w
x
which is
also ruled out by Assumption 2 , so it can not be an equilibrium.
There exist also mixed strategy equilibria. Since θH > 1 (single crossing condition holds)
the are only two candidates for mixed strategy equilibria. One in which the low type is
indiﬀerent between eL and eL while the high type chooses eH . And the other one in which
the low type chooses eL while the high type is indiﬀerent between eH and eH
The ﬁrst candidate is an equilibrium in range described in 1. and 2.. For this equilibrium
to exist the employers have to set the threshold to a level for which the low type is indiﬀerent
between exerting eﬀort eL = 0 and eL = eL, while the high type still has the incentives to
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exert eﬀort. The employer problem is then:
max
z≥0
´ +∞
z
−w + β(z) ∗ x dz
s.t. UH(eH) ≤ UH(eH)
UL(eL) ≥ UL(eL)
solved by z∗ = w − σ + σ2
2w
when σ ≤ σ1 and z∗ = (1+
√
2)(w−σ)σ
w
for higher values of σ.
For these thresholds to form an equilibrium, the low type has to choose the high eﬀort with
probability q such that sets the expected proﬁt on the marginal employee to zero.
β(z) =
λ ∗ φ( σ
wθH
− 1)
λ ∗ φ( σ
wθH
− 1) + (1− λ) ∗ (q ∗ φ( σ
w
− 1) + (1− q) ∗ φ( z
σ
)
= 0
It is the case for when the low type choose the high eﬀort with probability q = (w−x)λ
wθH(−1+λ)
in the range 1.. When σ is in the range 2. the low type mixes with probability q =
w((1+
√
2)θH(1−λ)+λ)σ−
√
2w2θH(1−λ)−xλσ√
2wθH(1−λ)(σ−w) . This probability falls to zero (i.e. the mixed strategy
equilibrium collapses to a full strategy equilibrium) as σ reaches σ2. For higher values of
noise the employer has to apply threshold deﬁned in 3..
There exist also an equilibrium in which high type does not exert high eﬀort with cer-
tainty. The high type is mixing between eH = eH and eH = 0 when the two actions give the
same pay-oﬀ, which happens when the employers threshold are suﬃciently high, i.e. :
z∗ =
(
1 +
√
2
)
(wθH − σ)σ
wθH
(3.6.2)
For this threshold to be sustained in equilibrium, the proﬁt on the marginal student has to
be zero. I.e. the high type has to choose high eﬀort with such probability h that, given the
threshold, the following is set to zero.
β(z) =
λ ∗ (h ∗ φ( σ
wθH
− 1) + (1− h) ∗ φ( z∗
σ
))
λ ∗ (h ∗ φ( σ
wθH
− 1) + (1− h) ∗ φ( z∗
σ
)) + (1− λ) ∗ φ( z∗
σ
)
= 0
Which is solved for
h =
√
2w2θH +
(
1 +
√
2
)
xλσ − w (√2xθHλ+ (1 +√2 + λ)σ)
λ
(√
2w2θH +
√
2xσ − w (√2xθH + σ +√2σ))
This equilibrium exists only for 2wθH −
√
2wθH < σ < σ3. For σ = 2wθH −
√
2wθH ,
z∗ = σ. For lower values of σ the low types exerting low eﬀort never gets employed, hence
Equation 3.6 is never 0. When σ > σ3 even if the high type exerts high eﬀort with certainty,
the noise is so high that the employer makes losses on the marginal employee, the equilibrium
collapses to separating equilibrium in which all the high types exert high eﬀort deﬁned earlier.
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Proof of Proposition 3.4.1
Depending on the level of σ and f , I distinguish three types of equilibria in which the high
type always enrols and exerts high eﬀort:
1. Type 1. An equilibrium in which the strategies stay the same as in the absence of
tuition fees (deﬁned in Proposition 3.3.1)
2. Type 2. An equilibrium in which an increase in tuition fee leads to a decrease in
employers threshold by the same value. In this equilibrium type low type mixes between
enrolment with exerting high eﬀort and staying out of education.
3. Type 3. An equilibrium in which an increase in tuition fee leads to a decrease in
employers threshold and low type's enrolment rate. In this equilibrium type, low type
mixes between enrolment with exerting low eﬀort and staying out of education.
When σ ≤ σ1, when tuition fees are set to zero, the employer's threshold is set to a level
that makes the low type indiﬀerent between exerting high and low eﬀort and the low type's
utility is zero. In this range of σ, for f < fC the equilibrium is of Type 2. The introduction
of tuition fees, keeping the threshold ﬁxed, makes the return from enrolment negative. The
threshold that makes the low type indiﬀerent between enrolment and exerting high eﬀort
and staying out of education is given by:
z∗ = w − σ + σ
2
2w
− f (3.6.3)
To make this threshold an equilibrium the low type's enrolment rate has to be such that the
employer earns zero proﬁt (Equation 3.2.3) on the marginal employee given the threshold,
given that:
β(z) =
λ ∗ φ( σ
wθH
− 1)
λ ∗ φ( σ
wθH
− 1) + dL ∗ (1− λ)φ( σwθL − 1))
This happens only when dL =
(w−x)λ
wθH(−1+λ) . The low type's enrolment level is equal to the
low type's probability of exerting high eﬀort in equilibrium with zero fees. This equilibrium
type is sustained only when f is not too high. When f = fC the low type's best response is
eL = 0 and further decrease of the low type's eﬀort with the decrease in the threshold is not
possible.
When σ < σ1 and f > fC the equilibrium is of Type 3. When high type always enrols and
chooses eH = eH and low type enrols only with probability dL and always chooses eL = 0,
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the employer sets a threshold that maximises Equation 3.2.3 given that:
β(z) =
λ ∗ φ( σ
wθH
− 1)
λ ∗ φ( σ
wθH
− 1) + dL ∗ (1− λ) ∗ φ( z∗σ )
Which is solved by
z∗(dL) = σ − (x− w)λσ
2
dLw2θH(1− λ) (3.6.4)
The low type enrols whenever the expected wage given the low eﬀort exceeds the fee.
w ∗
(
1−G
(
z(dL)
∗
σ
))
≤ f
It is easy to show that given the employers best response when dL = 1 the expected wage is
lower than the threshold and when dL = 0 the threshold is such that the optimal decision is
to enrol, therefore the only equilibrium candidate is such a level that sets the threshold to a
level that makes the low type indiﬀerent between the enrolment and no education. In other
words the threshold is such that the tuition fee is equal to the expected wage of a student
exerting zero eﬀort, which holds for:
dL(f) =

(x−w)λσ√
2
√
fw3/2θH(1−λ) if f < w/2(√
2
√
w−f√
w
− 1
)
σ if f > w/2
(3.6.5)
The change of the expression at f = w/2 results from the shape of the single peaked
density function at the median.
Substituting Equation 3.6.5 into Equation 3.6.4 the employer's equilibrium threshold is
given by:
z(f)∗ =
 σ −
√
2
√
fσ√
w
if f < w/2
(2
√
w+
√
2
√−f+w)(w−x)λσ
2w3/2(f+w)θH(−1+λ) if f > w/2
(3.6.6)
The result implies that in Type 3 equilibrium there is a unique monotonic relation between
the tuition fees and low type's equilibrium enrolment rate.
When σ1 < σ < σ2 and f < fB or when σ2 < σ < σ3 and f < fA the equilibrium is of
Type 1. Tuition fee does not aﬀect the equilibrium strategies as the fee is lower than the
expected wage of a student exerting zero eﬀort. In this range even with tuition fees low type
enrolment decisions still assure positive payoﬀ.
When σ1 < σ < σ2 and f = fB the low type's utility equals zero, further increase in
tuition fees requires a reduction in the employer's threshold to make the low type enrol.
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Therefore, for higher values of f the only equilibrium is of the Type 2, in which z∗ =
w− σ+ σ2
2w
− f , the low type enrols with probability dL = (w−x)λwθH(−1+λ) , high type always enrol
and both types exert high eﬀort. Further increase (when fC < f < fD), similarly as in
previously described case σ < σ1 leads to a Type 3 equilibrium.
When σ2 < σ < σ3, f = fA sets the low type's utility to zero and further increase leads
to Type 3 equilibrium for fA < f < fB when σ2 < σ < w and for fA < f < fD when
w < σ < σ3. When σ2 < σ < w and f = fB the equilibrium threshold reduces to a level
that the low type's best response is to exert high eﬀort and thus for fB < f < fC the only
equilibrium is of Type 2. When fC < f < fD similarly as in the case when σ < σ2 the
equilibrium is of Type 3.
When σ3 < σ < θH ∗w there is no separating equilibrium without tuition fees. However,
tuition fees may help restore it. Note that since σ3 > w, when σ > σ3 low type never
exerts eﬀort (see Equation 3.3.2) therefore the mechanism existing in Type 3 equilibrium
that assures the unique relation between tuition fee and low type's enrolment, given high
type's enrolment and high eﬀort applies also here. Suppose that high type always enrols
and exerts high eﬀort, low type never exerts high eﬀort and employer's threshold is given
by Equation 3.6.6. In this case identifying the tuition fee that restores the separation is
equivalent to identifying a fee that makes the high type indiﬀerent between the high and low
eﬀort, i.e. the fee that solves the following equation.
w ∗
(
1−G
(
z∗(f)− eH(z∗(f))
σ
))
− eH(z
∗(f))
θH
= w ∗
(
1−G
(
z∗(f)
σ
))
The equality holds for
f =
2w2θ2H − 2
(
2 +
√
2
)
wθHσ +
(
3 + 2
√
2
)
σ2
2wθ2H
= fE
For higher fees (fE < f < fD) a separating equilibrium exists.
Similarly the the case without tuition fees there exists also an equilibrium in which high
type does not exert high eﬀort with certainty. This equilibrium, described in the proof of
Proposition 3.3.1, exists as long as f < fE, i.e. the fee is lower than the expected utility of
an agent exerting no eﬀort given the employer's threshold in this equilibrium type.
There exist also two types of trivial equilibria. In one type, that exists for all parameters,
none of the types enrols and the employer never employs. In the other type the fee is so high
that none of the types exerts eﬀort (fD < f < w). In this equilibrium both high and low
types enrol only with probability such that low type enrolment probability is λ(x−w)
(1−λ)w times
greater than high type's enrolment and the employer employs with probability f/w. In this
equilibrium all players receive zero utility.
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Proof of Proposition 3.5.1
Of the equilibrium types described in Proposition 3.4.1 only in Type 3 an increase in tuition
fee may positively aﬀect high type's utility. In Type 1 equilibrium, an increase in tuition
fees leads only to a decrease of students utilities as the equilibrium strategies do not change
with tuition fees. In Type 2 equilibrium an increase in tuition fees results in a decrease
of employer's threshold. However the additional pecuniary costs exceeds the savings on
educational eﬀort. A unit increase in tuition fees leads, in equilibrium, to a unit decrease
in employers' threshold, which brings a unit decrease in high type's eﬀort. Since θH > 1
the resulting savings on eﬀort cost are lower than the additional pecuniary costs. In Type
3 equilibrium the substitutability of tuition fees and employer's threshold is non linear. In
that range, due to unique relation between f and z∗ established in Equation 3.6.6, choosing
the optimal tuition fee, for f < f/2 is equivalent to maximising the following
U(f, ·) =max
f
w ∗
(
1−G
(
z∗(f)− eH(z∗(f), ·)
σ
))
− eH(z
∗(f), ·))
θH
− f =
=max
f
w − 2σ
θH
+
√
2
√
fσ√
wθH
+
σ2
2wθ2H
− f
The optimal fee is
f ∗ =
σ2
2wθ2H
(3.6.7)
which results in low type's enrolment rate d∗L =
λ(x−w)
(1−λ)w and high type's utility U(f
∗, ·) =
(wθH−σ)2
wθ2H
.
The utility as a function of f is increasing for fA < f < f
∗ only in the range of parameters
for which Type 3 equilibrium exist. To ﬁnd the global optimum I compare the utility at f ∗
with utility at f = 0 (when the separating equilibrium with no fees exists, i.e. σ < σ3)
when the employer's threshold is deﬁned in Equation 3.6.1 or with utility at f = fE with
the threshold deﬁned by Equation 3.6.6 for higher values of σ. It can be shown that when
σ < σ3 the utility of high types under the optimal tuition fee f
∗ exceeds the utility under
no fees, i.e.
(wθH − σ)2
wθ2H
> w − 2σ
θH
+
(w − 3wλ+ 2xλ)σ2
2w2θ2H(1− λ)
only when the proportion of high types is not too high (λ < w
2x−w ). When σ > σ3 the utility
with f ∗ is always higher than utility with f = fE.
Furthermore, f ∗ can be the optimal fee only if stays within the range allowed by Type 3
equilibrium, i.e. for σ2 < σ < w when it does not exceed fB. It is the case for σ >
√
2wθH
θH+
√
2θH−1 .
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For lower values of σ, f ∗ = fB can be the optimal fee if the resulting utility exceeds util-
ity with no tuition fees, which happens when σ < 2w
3/2θH(1−λ)√
w((2+
√
2)θH−
√
2)(1−λ)+
√
2−2λ√w+wλ−2xλ .
Resulting low type's enrolment rate is dL(fB) =
σλ(w−x)
(1−λ)w(
√
2w−(1+
√
2)σ)θH
.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.2
Total welfare, given the equilibrium actions of the players, is deﬁned as the probability of
employment of good students on high skill jobs net of the total educational eﬀort and is
given by:
VSW = λ ∗ x ∗
(
1−G
(
z∗(f, ·)− e∗H(f, ·)
σ
))
− λ ∗ e
∗
H(f, ·)
θH
− (1− λ) ∗ dL(f) ∗ e∗L(f, ·)
To see that the social welfare is maximised for f = fD note that the ﬁrst component of the
equation above, given the high type's best response is to exert high eﬀort, is not aﬀected by
a threshold and hence does not change with tuition fees. Employer's threshold and hence
the students eﬀort in each equilibrium type is weakly decreasing in f (strictly for f > fB)
and reaches its minimum at f = fD. Finally low type's eﬀort for f > fC is zero.
Employer's proﬁt is given by:
VE = λ∗(x−w)∗
(
1−G
(
z∗(f, ·)− e∗H(f, ·)
σ
))
−(1−λ)∗w∗dL(f)∗
(
1−G
(
z∗(f, ·)− e∗L(f, ·)
σ
))
(3.6.8)
The ﬁrst component, expected proﬁt from employing the high type, does not change
with tuition fees, as long as the high type exerts high eﬀort. The second component, loss on
employing low types, depends on the level of eﬀort and employment probability and, if the
low type exerts low eﬀort, also on the threshold level.
Substituting Equation 3.6.5 and Equation 3.6.6 into Equation 3.6.8 one can verify that
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the employer's proﬁt is given by one of the following expressions depending on parameters:
VE (eL = eL ∧ (f < fC ∧ σ < σ1 ∨ σ1 < σ < w ∧ fB < f < fC)) =
(x− w)(θH − 1)λ
(
2w2θH + σ
2
)
2w2θ2H
VE (eL = eL ∧ σ1 < σ < σ2 ∧ f < fA) =
=
1
2
(x− w)λ
(
2− σ
2
w2θ2H
)
−
(−√2w2θH(−1 + λ) + w ((1 +√2) θH(−1 + λ)− λ)σ + xλσ) (1− σ22w2)√
2θH(w − σ)
VE (eL = 0 ∧ f < fA ∧ σ2 < σ < w) =
(x− w)λ (2w3θ2H(1− λ)− (w − 2wλ+ xλ)σ2)
2w3θ2H(1− λ)
VE
(
eL = 0 ∧
(
fA < f < fB ∧ σ2 < σ < w ∨ σ > w ∧ fA < f < w
2
))
=
=
(x− w)λ (2w2θ2H − σ (√2√fwθH + σ))
2w2θ2H
VE
(
eL = 0 ∧
(
fC < f < fD ∧ σ < w ∨ σ > w ∧ w
2
< f < fD
))
=
=
(x− w)λ
(
2w3θ2H − wσ2 + f
(
2w2θ2H − 2wθHσ − σ
(√
2
√
w(−f + w)θH + σ
)))
2w2(f + w)θ2H
Firstly, employer's proﬁt is strictly higher in equilibria in which low type exerts zero
eﬀort. For f < w/2 when low type's exert high eﬀort, the median of the low type eﬀort
distribution is higher than the employer's threshold. While when the low type choose low
eﬀort, as long as f < w/2, signal distribution is lower than the threshold. For f > w/2
median of both distributions is higher than the threshold, but when the employment rate
strictly lower in equilibria in which the low type exerts zero eﬀort.
When the tuition fees and noise level are such that low eﬀort is the low type's optimal
strategy, employer's pay-oﬀ is non-monotonic in tuition fees. In those equilibria, for f < fA,
as in the third row, the proﬁts are independent of f . Employer's proﬁt is decreasing in
f for fA < f < 2w
(√
2− 1) and increasing for higher values of f . An equilibrium in
which proﬁt is increasing in f exists only for σ <
√
6− 4√2wθH . For higher values of σ,
fD < 2w
(√
2− 1) and hence the non trivial employment equilibrium does not exist. It
always holds that σ3 >
√
6− 4√2wθH .
It always holds that, whenever equilibrium exists for both f ∈ [0, fA) and for f =
fD employer's proﬁt is strictly higher for f ∈ [0, fA). The increase in proﬁts above f =
2w
(√
2− 1) does not compensate the losses accruing for f ∈ (fA, 2w (√2− 1).
95
